Nitō-ryū

GONE FISHIN'

2009-06-24T00:20:00.000-07:00

Posting will be sparse, I have a new military adventure in progress . . .

Good times.

2009-06-07T17:26:00.000-07:00

In the FATA and NWFP areas of Pakistan: tribes are awakening to the threat the Taliban pose to their way of life. Moderate Muslim clerics have backed the Pakistani Army offensive, and many tribes are forming militias to help fight the Taliban. Even once vocal supporters have turned against them following the bombing of a mosque.

In Lebanon: the March 14th Coalition appears to have won a decisive victory in the Lebanese elections. Analysts had been suggesting, and polls indicating, that a Hezbollah-Christian coalition was posied to sweep into power. But it now appears that the pro-western March 14th Coalition has won enough seats to remain in power.

We now have to work with the Pakistani military and intelligence services to capitalize on the recent turn in events and surging momentum against the Taliban. And the Lebanese now face the struggle of putting together a working government, hopefully with fewer assassinations and car bombings than last time . . .

Combined with the Congress Party's enormous success in India in recent elections there, things have been going pretty well for moderates throughout the world. (Aside from in Europe, but who cares about that socially stagnant place?)

Why China won't be more proactive in punishing North Korea

2009-06-03T13:41:00.000-07:00

China has entered into a devils bargain with North Korea. Whenever you hear about the Chinese government doing this or that, I want you to think of one word: "Stability." The Chinese are obsessed with stability because they need continuous economic growth to have any chance at surviving their demographic transition to an elderly population. For this reason, China always takes the most cautious approach when it comes to anything. If the party thought they could transition to democracy tomorrow without destabilizing the country, they would do it. But they believe (probably correctly, at least for the next decade or so) a significant state hand in guiding business and politics is the only way to ensure that their economy is able to provide for their population.

So when it comes to North Korea, they prop up the regime not out of some brotherly support or commitment, but because a failed state bordering them is unacceptable. And a failed state is exactly what North Korea would be without Chinese aid. They look down on Kim Jong-il and his cronies, his state is a constant reminder of the failures of Maoist agricultural policies, something the Chinese themselves moved past decades ago. When the most recent nuke test was conducted, every market in the region save Japan took a hit. China wants that cash money, and the only reason that they tolerate Kim's shenanigans cutting into their bottom line, is because cutting him off would hurt them even more.

Now if China does have influence on North Korean behavior, we can pressure China into calming Kim's ass down or quietly getting rid of him altogether by convincing the world that only China can change North Korea's behavior (true, barring a VERY unlikely US military intervention) therefore China is responsible for North Korea, and must act to prevent instability in the region. Essentially, every time North Korea does something, start blaming China for not actively working to stop them. Kind of like how people blame the US every time Israel does something they don't like.

But I fear that especially now with a leadership transition taking place even China has far less influence in the region than they let on. The real reason for all the sabre rattling, is quite simply to help strengthen the leadership during the succession. Kim Jong-il now has a visible droop (see picture above) on his left side from the stroke. They're afraid that they might appear weak to the outside world, and more importantly, to their domestic audience. And in the middle of a transition to Kim Jong-un, this cannot stand.

China realizes that an open and reunified Korean peninsula is in everyone's interests. After all, who wants a potential nuclear conflict next door to them? But they don't really know how to make that happen, and neither do we. It will happen the day that the US and China finally come to the realization that only by working together can they accomplish all the things they want to in the coming century.

North Korea and the Bifurcated Force . . .

2009-05-29T14:53:00.000-07:00

I spend most of my time talking about the Stability and Support side of my "divided force" structure. But the Katana side is important too. In addition to nuclear weapons that maintain the status quo of the international system, a dedicated strike force is needed to take down bad actors at what Kenneth Waltz calls the nation-state level of analysis.

The initial invasion force in Iraq which destroyed the military capability of Iraq under Saddam Hussein consisted of the following main combat elements:

I MEF:

1st Marine Division (3 Heavy Brigades)
1st UK Division (1 Commando, 1 Air Assault, 1 Armoured Brigade)

V Corps:

3rd Infantry Division (3 Heavy Brigades)
101st Airborne Division (3 Air Assault Brigades)
2nd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division

Other:

Various Special Operations Task Forces
173rd Airborne Brigade

Note that all of these forces consist of either Heavy or Airborne/Air Assault BCTs in modern parlance, such is the composition of the Katana force. All told there are 7 Heavy Brigades and 6 Airborne/Commando/Air Assault Brigades. This force was sufficient for the initial invasion and the complete destruction of Iraqi military capability. They were utterly inappropriate and insufficient for the following stability and support operations.

North Korea is the largest, most dangerous, and most likely target for military invasion in the world today. While the posession of nuclear weapons makes such an act very risky, the low number of weapons combined with their inability to be mounted on ballistic missiles at this time presents a narrow window in which regime change might occur. Additionally, at 1.2 million, the military force is approximately 3.2X what the regime of Saddam Hussein was able to field at the time. Improvements in support and logisitcs would allow us to get away with a force 3x the size used in Iraq. So based solely on the invasion force needed to take down the Hussein-era military, I project that you would need somewhere in the neighborhood of 21 Heavy Brigades and 18 Forced Entry Capable Brigades would be required.

The US Army has 19 Heavy Brigade Combat Teams and 10 Forced Entry Capable Brigades.
The British could offer, at a stretch, 2 more of each.
And with the Marine RCTs able to switch between Forced Entry or Heavy roles depending on equipment provided, we would reach the requisite number.
And thats before you even begin to count South Korea's 20 Division Force (more equivalent to large Heavy BCTs).

So it could be done. I'm not advocating it, and the casualties amongst all forces and civilian populations would be worse than we can imagine. Additionally, it would require us to completely abandon all other global commitments. And we can expect to spend at least a decade trying to integrate a devestated penninsula back into the global community without upsetting the delicate balance of power in East Asia.

There is another card on the table, however, and that is China. If North Korean behavior grows threatening enough to affect that hyper-capitalist power's bottom line, even they will want to see them go. And they certainly DO have the manpower. Their force probably would only be able to play a minimal role in an invasion, but in the stability and support operations afterwards, China and South Korea would have the presence and the legitimacy to make a stable penninsula happen. The US would still be left with the difficult task of playing referee and getting China to accept a reunified Korea. But in this age of globalization, the prospect of a Korea that can be friendly to both China and the US isn't hard to imagine.

Additionally, this would essentially be the last major regime change the US could forseeably undertake. With the important possible exception of Myanmar, another place where cooperation with China would be key. Those two scenarios are perhaps the only currently forseeable times where the US will ever again be engaged in ground-based maneuver warfare. Maintaining a regime change force after those operations would be important both as a deterrent against rogue regimes and a hedge against any unforseen state-on-state conflict, but the force could be much smaller, enabling us to focus additional resources on "preventive medicine" in the form of soft power and the usage of the Wakizashi.

Why you should be a Political Scientist . . .

2009-05-26T08:50:00.000-07:00

Here is something more relevant to my own personal background as a Political Science major:

This is a fascinating look at decision making in Iran that underlines a fundamental shift that has occurred in the fields of Political Science and International Relations over the last several decades. Namely, the reduction of complex interactions between individuals into mathematical models that can be used in a wider range of situations and scenarios. This model, produced by one of the core personalities of the Political Science community, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, is compelling. Not only for its intracacy but also for what I believe to be a correct interpretation of the various actors and influences on Iranian politics and the likely future outcomes.

So study Math kids, its everywhere.

The Global Commons

2009-05-14T02:48:00.000-07:00

I liked Gates quote about the global commons, something along the lines of America's military mission being to insure access for all to the Sea, the Air, Space, and Cyberspace. These are the vital areas through which international commerce must travel.

Our mission is not so much about denying access as it is about ensuring it. Keeping the sea lanes open for freighters, the air safe for airline traffic, space secured for commercial and military use, and cyberspace access protected for individuals and corporations alike. This is outlined in the National Defense Strategy and a key component is cooperative military engagement to provide security. I think we are seeing the beginnings of this off the coast of Somalia, and I believe it will one day extend to aerospace and cyberspace as well.

Pakistan on the Brink . . .

2009-05-01T21:08:00.000-07:00

How would the US respond if an armed extremist organization only nominally supportive of certain parts of the government were inching closer to Washington D.C. and had just passed Fredricksburg, VA?

Probably not as lackadaisically as the Pakistani government seems to be acting. While they have taken the fight to the enemy in recent days, it was only after intense international and domestic pressure to do so. It's enough to make even the most ardent believer in democracy long for the days of Musharraf. You need a country to have a democracy. How can the government possibly be so relaxed about an armed challenger only 60 miles away from the capital?

First, the weak government in Pakistan offers little in the way of constraint or control over the nations military, unlike the previous regime. In a country where political power has been defined by the relationship between the military and the leader for so long, we now have Asif Ali Zadari. Enough said.

But foremost, the military is a potential challenger to the civilian government. Every inch of ground the Taliban gain weakens the civilian government, and helps to enable a greater role for the military and intelligence services in the political process. So by not fighting the Taliban, the military makes its own political position stronger. This is a dangerous game of chicken to play. If the Taliban gain too much, they might just trigger a fracturing of the country itself.

The Pakistani military is tipping its hand quite a bit if you know where to look:

Requesting the handover of US military drones to their control.
General Kayani has developed quite the working relationship with Adm Mullen, who in turn, has been talking him up before Congress.
Getting the OSD to call for increased spending, not in police or other COIN-related fields, but in direct military aid.

The Pakistani military, having now waited long enough to clearly demonstrate the civilian government's ineptitude (despite their own complacency in the matter) is now striking back against the Taliban with its full force. A successful, continuous campaign has the potential to gain even more political capital which it can then use to further undermine the civilian government. Whether it is Gen Kayani himself, or the leader of ISI, or some broader consensus reached among the large military establishment, it is clear that the apparent ineptitude of the Pakistani military is not incompetence, but rather a careful game of brinksmanship with a dangerous foe.

Branches? We don't need no stinkin' branches!

2009-04-23T16:07:00.000-07:00

I prefer a Waltzian disaggregation of the Armed Forces over this archaic "branch" notion.

System Level - Strategic deterrence to maintain the global political and economic system. Nuclear weapons, high technology research done by DARPA, and the gradual prototype development of major weapons platforms like the DDG-1000.

State Level - Maintain an intervention force that deploys on a surge basis against a rogue state or regime. This force must be able to rapidly mobilize and deploy against states that violate the basic rules of international governance. Like committing genocide or developing WMDs. Airborne BCTs, CVNs/LHDs/LHAs, major surface combatants, Marine RCTs, etc.

Individual Level - The counter-insurgency, training, and advisory force. The force that rolls in after the Marines but before State Dept. They come in with international parters, OGAs, NGOs, etc. Primarily people based. Advising teams, infantry, civil affairs, psy ops, etc.

Special Operations - They perform tasks in all three areas but they really specialize in managing the transistions between these levels. Some, like SEALs and Rangers, mainly work between the system and state level. Others, like Special Forces, are specialized for somewhere between the State and individual level. The super secret squirrels in 1st SFOD or ST 6, work between the individual level and maintaining the overall global status quo.

There is probably room for another level of analysis for groups, especially in the context of ethnically-driven conflict. Kurds, Iraqi Sunnis, Pashtun, etc. Something else to think about it . . .

In the Korengal Valley . . .

2009-04-18T00:14:00.000-07:00

I try to avoid chest thumping when US military forces engage the enemy and are victorious. I refrained from commenting on the successful end of the hostage situation off the coast of Somalia because I recognize the dangerous escalation it represents. While I am glad for the safe return of the Captain, what was a money-driven criminal activity now includes a revenge-driven ideological conflict with (who else?) the United States.

Death should neither inspire glee, nor paralyze with fear, but instead should draw a healthy respect from those of us to whom it is a constant companion. As such, every decision we make carries with it a certain finality, every choice carries the weight of the world. In the Korengal Valley, a 2nd Lieutenant named Smith made an excellent choice selecting an ambush site that resulted in definitive victory against insurgents in that area.

New York Times

About 50 yards separated the two sides, but Lieutenant Smith did not want to start shooting too soon, he said, “because if too many lived then we’d be up there fighting them all night.”

Hopefully this action will enable more population-centric strategies to succeed. Such strategies, tedious and fragile as they are, represent the only means of creating enough stability to build the governance and economic infrastructure to allow us to someday leave without eventually returning. Now the Army must capitalize on the information operations (IO) potential of this fight to create a narrative that the Insurgents can offer only endless war against an ever-shrinking global community, where as the Coalition can offer economic development and opportunity, and better institutions of governance. Of course, we have to live up to our ideals as well.

Nevertheless, the Soldiers of 1st ID in the Korengal Valley have given us the opportunity not to fail them. And for that, they have my appreciation as great Soldiers and fellow brothers-in-arms.

To Boldy Go . . .

2009-04-14T21:33:00.000-07:00

Seeing as how I am a complete nerd, I am preposterously excited for this movie. Note the Trans-America Tower on the right side of the background.

In order to keep things within the scope of this blog, let's take a moment to consider the strategic implications of the way the world will look in 2300, around the time when USS Enterprise (NCC-1701-B) launches. I'll be using UN demographic data (pdf!) keeping in mind that one of the study's own essays begins with the assertion that, "Once more the United Nations Population Division has boldly gone where few demographers have dared go before." Here goes.

The average life expectancy will range from 87 to 106 years, depending on country of origin. That is a lot of social entitlement spending for governments to be responsible for.
The world median age will be 48 years. Guess the retirement age is going to have to rise quite a bit.
Population estimates range from a staggering 36.4 billion (start building those planetary explorers NOW!) to a shriveled 2.3 billion (who is going to pay social security then?). The most likely medium scenario which allows for growth to a peak around 2050 followed by a slight decline and then slower, non-exponential growth rates puts the population at a more manageable 9 billion around 2300.
Europe will decline from today's 730 million or so to 611 million
North America will rise in population from 316 million to 534 million
The Oceania region sees growth from 31 million to 48 million
Latin America and the Caribbean expands from 520 million to 723 million
Asia will grow dramatically from 3.7 billion today to 4.9 billion
And Africa will grow the most, from 793 million to 2.1 billion
Given the amount of people being born in poorer regions (which will be most affected by global warming) this will likely result in not a bright utopian techno-paradise, nor (thanks to economic growth) a dystopian overcrowded nightmare. Rather, the world will look, at least from an economic inequality standpoint, much as it does today.
I suspect that by this time, advances in education and the spread of information and technology will make population the most valuable source of national power. In the realization of a Flat World, as Thomas Friedman calls it, if everyone is more or less equally capable, then true power will come from those that have the most people.
Accordingly, I present to you, the G-20 (most populous nations):

India
China
The United States of America
Pakistan
Nigeria
Indonesia
Bangladesh
Brazil
Ethiopia
The Democratic Republic of the Congo
Uganda
Yemen
Mexico
Philippines
Egypt
Vietnam
Iran
Japan
Nigeria
The Russian Federation

Of course, that assumes that the predominant actor will still be nation-states. I believe there is strong evidence to suggest that regional unions, if not the most important actors in international politics, will surely be at least as powerful as the EU is today. Accordingly, here is a ranking based on today's major regional groups. Perhaps this will be the future UN Social Council?

South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (~2 billion)
The African Union (~2 billion)
China (~1.3 billion)
The Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (~600 million)
The European Union (~550 million)
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (~650 million)
Union of South American Nations (~550 million)
Eurasian Economic Community (~200 million)
Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (CCASG) (~200 million)
Iran (100 million)
Japan (100 million)
All others less than 100 million each

From this I believe a natural rule set arises that could lead to representation for future global legislature. Each political entity would be awarded a number of seats proportional to their population.

Notably, the population of say, an internationally built starship would be expected to have similar representation. That is: 24% South Asian, 26% African, 16% Chinese, 7% North American, 7% from ASEAN, 6% from the EU, 6% from South America, 2% from Russia or its neighbors, 2% from the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (CCASG) and 1% each from Japan, Iran, the Pacfic Islands Forum and the Caribbean Community.

A future UN Security Council that determines how such a vessel is used would probably have a single representative from each of the actors listed above, as well as a unified Korea. Voting is determined by how much money each player is willing to spend on any given endeavour. No veto power. Thus it would represent every major military and economic power on the planet:

The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
The European Union
The Security and Prosperity Partnership for North America
The Union of South American Nations
The African Union
The Eurasian Economic Community
Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf
The Caribbean Community
The Pacific Islands Forum
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations
China
Iran
Japan
Korea

What to do about Somalia?

2009-04-10T05:03:00.000-07:00

In observing the pirate attack on the US-flagged cargo ship, Maersk Alabama, I can't help but recognize how inadequate our institutions are for dealing with international crimes. Seeing as how this is going to be a very international 21st century, the longer we delay on this matter, the longer we suffer. Common solutions alternate between reverting to an 18th-century mindset or engaging in a strategically infeasible 3rd concurrent nation-building effort in Somalia. I don't believe that we can hang our way out of the prevailing economic concerns driving Somalis toward piracy, nor do we have the manpower or resources, even with the help of our allies, to create a stable Somalia. In the long-term, the latter is the only real solution, but in the mean time, we can do better.

Currently, the Obama administration has utilized the Kenyan court system as a stop-gap measure for addressing piracy. Given that most crimes happen in international waters, the only difference between having the Kenyan courts handle captured pirates and having the US courts do it is that Kenya is in Africa. This helps avoid charges of US imperialism, but really is only a cosmetic difference.

And piracy is far from the only international crime that needs an international framework to be addressed. Human trafficking, the international illicit narcotics trade, terrorism and fanaticism, all need to be addressed by a global quorum. These are common threats that require common, established, solutions.

The "west" by itself no longer constitutes such a quorum. Any such creation would have to have the support of the G-20 nations. Parochial interests regarding sovereignty would have to give way to a realization that these illicit actors pose a grave threat to domestic economic and social well-being, as well as national security. The Hague was a nice try, but the concept has to move beyond war crimes or even a single, consolidated location. I am talking about a global court system that has prosecutorial powers, as well as a system for finding suitable imprisonment facilities.

Such a system would greatly benefit the US, allowing us to demystify terrorists and have them tried publicly, where their sins and unglamorous lifestyle would be on full display. Narcotics traffickers could be tried outside their home country where court systems may be too corrupt to be effective, human traffickers as well would be unable to find refuge in their home country.

We have established a set of rules, regulations, courts, and best practices in the realm of warfare. The Gevena Conventions, the Hague, all are representative of a larger rule set that governs inter-state warfare. We need a similar system to address international crimes. Or they will continue to plague us.

UPDATE: Does Fred Kaplan read the blog? Same idea published in Slate.

Gates announces FY10 Defense budget

2009-04-06T20:53:00.000-07:00

It's going to be a knock-down, drag-out fight. And because he tried to ease people into it by taking a couple years to switch things up, its going to get ugly with Congress members firing his own quotes back at him from when he defended various platforms. Not many surprises, most changes have been leaked for weeks:

AF

F-22's hold at 187
Increase F-35 purchase
More ISR aircraft
Tankers getting punted to next year
C-17 production will end at 205, I guess that's enough

Navy

CVN's cut to 10
LCS procurement gets expanded, along with JHSV

Army

FCS family of vehicles is done, but the toys developed to support it remain
The BCT shell game is being put on hold, we stay at 45 versus increasing to the theoretical 48
Increased funding to fly and maintain helicopter support

Marines

Delay of 11th LPD and the MLP
And if FCS vehicles got the axe, it can't be healthy for EFV

Strategic

Missle Defense Agency rightfully gets castrated, with a change in focus from strategic to theatre
Beginning selection of a new SSBN . . . given the expense of that platform, seems a strange time to start on that
Other programs awaiting evaluation given the President's moves to restart strategic arms limitation talks

Defense

Taking all those independent contractors and moving them onto the regular civilian payroll, doesn't change much other than increasing accountability and transparency, which is a very good thing

Read the full announcement here. There are reactions and coverage at Danger Room, Information Dissemination, Barnett's weblog, and well, pretty much everyone has something to say about it.

On safe havens . . .

2009-04-04T17:58:00.000-07:00

Going after every regional safe haven presents many challenges, and some would say it is better that we retreat within our borders and build a, "Fortress America," as a means of self defense. I present the following, originally posted as a comment on Abu Muqawama:

Fortress America has the advantage of being the cheapest course of action, but that is about it.

It doesn't take a lot to stir the pot and foster resentment against the US. Like it or not, wherever someone sees economic expansion eroding human welfare, we will be seen as the culprit. We are the face of Globalization, and will continue to be so for the next several decades at least.

Certainly our involvement in Southwest Asia was minuscule in September of 2001 in comparison to what it is today. But that was not enough to protect us. We can't have American security without global security, whether it be military, economic, or social in nature.

Firewalling ourselves off from the world can't protect our businesses that rely on international trade and finance to function, it will leave a tremendous security gap in many regions that rely on the US military presence for regional stability. If we pull out of the southwest Pacific, regional players like Japan and China will step up and quite possibly trigger an arms race. If we pull out of Southwest Asia, the same will occur with Saudi Arabia and Iran. It won't take long for these problems to reach us back on our continent.

The real key is to work with regional partners to create a cooperative global security establishment. Build up the AU and let them address Somalia. Work with the PLAN to patrol the Malacca Straits, Create partnerships with Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan to address the poppy trade.

We won't go after every terrorist haven, but we will train, equip, and support the regional leaders that do. We set the agenda and give the locals a push in the right direction, and let them do it their way. I think that is the real essence of a, "New American Security."

The new Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy . . .

2009-03-31T23:18:00.000-07:00

Andrew Exum has an article at The New Republic that makes a lot of sense as usual. He's the namesake blogger on Abu Muqawama (link on the left side of this blog).

The strategy is pretty vague so far, those of us who have read the white paper on the strategy are concerned by the overwhelming lack of any detail on pretty much anything other than troop numbers, which of course, can help, but can't win the war.

Exum correctly asserts that the key lies in improving governance in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, and doing so takes more civilian that military boots on the ground. This is a mission for USAID to take the lead in, while most of the military provides them security and trains the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police, SOF hunts for the really bad guys, and State coordinates the regional players, EU, Iran, Russia, India, and sure enough, China (the number one investor in Afghanistan).

House Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces

2009-03-31T22:40:00.000-07:00

That's kind of a mouthful, but basically, in the House there is a committee on the Armed Services. Within this committee is a subcommittee whose responsibility is the oversight of the US Navy, US Marine Corps, and US Coast Guard. Well they had one of this blog's favorite strategic thinkers over to testify on Thursday, and a lot of important things got said there. I wasn't there personally, but Thomas P.M. Barnett testified and has a couple blog posts about the hearing on his weblog if you want to clicky the link on the left.

Notable was the agreement that the budget will be reduced. Naturally, there were differing opinions on where the cuts should come from. This blogger supports a drastic decrease in Carrier Strike Groups. Currently the requirement is 12 Carrier Strike Groups, and 11 Expeditionary Strike Groups. The standard 1/3 operating ratio means that only 4 Carriers are deployable at any given time. That is an awful lot of power concentrated on very few platforms. And any risk to these platforms in necessarily utterly unacceptable. Expeditionary Strike Groups are divided among 3 major vessel types in addition to their surface combatant escorts:

LHA/LHD's are like smaller aircraft carriers that bring helicopter and fixed-wing close air support.
LPD's carry tanks, vehicles, and the hovercraft we use to put them ashore. The big ship in the center of the picture above is a San Antonio-class LPD.
LSD's carry additional hovercraft and equipment. The ship in the lead of the formation in the picture is a Whidbey Island-class LSD.

This means that for 11 Expeditionary Strike Groups you actually get 33 major platforms that can spread US influence and operate with Global Partnership Stations, support Marines or other ground forces, hunt pirates, or look for terrorists. The only thing they can't do is carry the larger fixed-wing aircraft needed for long range air support. At the beginning of the century the battleship replaced the dreadnought. Following Pearl Harbor, the Battleship was replaced by the Aircraft Carrier as the primary means of force projection. And even though it never fired a shot, the real key to naval power projection during the Cold War was the nuclear submarine, both attack and ballistic missile types. Today, it is the Amphibious warship that most represents the means by which we project power and influence. They alone, among major naval platforms can exert influence in the littoral regions. In combination with the LCS, they provide a powerful tool for exerting control in the most important regions of the world's ocean's, the places where the people are. For this reason, I believe the number of Carriers should be reduced from 12 to 6, and the number of Amphibious warships expanded from 33 to 45, for a total of 15 Expeditionary Strike Groups.

Used Ship salesman?

2009-03-31T22:32:00.000-07:00

An interesting idea being floated ::groan:: by the likes of Bob Work and Thomas P.M. Barnett is to sell LCS to developing navies and coast guards around the world after we use them. Not only does it help us recoup some of the procurement cost, but it helps build a truly global cooperative coast guard in the spirit of the National Maritime Strategy. I think it's is a brilliant example of how we can export security and help to stabilize the global system in a more meaningful manner than simply selling more guns.

Our Supranational World . . .

2009-03-18T19:46:00.000-07:00

The Supranational World, an estimate of the global map in 2020, by moi.

With global trade talks somewhat stalled and trade protectionism on the rise, much to the chargin of anyone familiar with economics or the history of recessions, I wonder if regional trade organizations will take a front seat for the next 5-10 years or so until the US can get back on track as a leader in spreading the global community.

While coordinated global action is important, especially from groups like the G-20, regional organizations have an advantage in that the danger of sudden exposure to the global economy is lessened by first having to compete on a regional level. Countries that share borders also tend to share other economic and political interests, making faster coordination and integration possible.

I also think building such organizations should be a primary US foreign policy tool, rogue regimes are much less likely to continue their shennanigans when they have to answer to their regional partners rather than just the Great Imperialist Power. It's hard to deny, for example, that the Southern African countries have been able to exert more influence than the US in Zimbabwe.

Iran - admittance to either the Gulf Cooperation Council or the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation could be a powerful carrot to regulate Iranian behavior through economic sanctions or free trade.

North Korea - would be hard pressed not to accept access to a not yet existant East Asian Economic Community. The Chinese and South Koreans would both put a lot of pressure on them to lower their isolationist stance.

Cuba - admittance to CariCom in exchange for Human Rights improvements . . .

Pakistan

2009-03-18T19:28:00.000-07:00

Since it has been out in the public for awhile now, I'll comment on the basing of Predator UAV's, (not DoD's by the way) inside Pakistan. I suppose one way to avoid unseemly border confrontations is to avoid having to cross the border in the first place. A good question to ask might be whether or not the drone basing rights were issued under the Musharraf or Zadari governments.

Also, according to the Pashtun Peace Forum, Pakistani's in the Tribal regions don't totally hate the drone strikes:

-- Do the militant organizations get damaged due to drone attacks? (Yes 60%, No 40%)
-- Do you see drone attacks bringing about fear and terror in the common people? (Yes 45%, No 55%)
-- Do you think the drones are accurate in their strikes? (Yes 52%, No 48%)
-- Do you think anti-American feelings in the area increased due to drone attacks recently? (Yes 42%, No 58%)
-- Should Pakistan military carry out targeted strikes at the militant organizations? (Yes 70%, No 30%)
-- Do the militant organizations get damaged due to drone attacks? (Yes 60%, No 40%)

Operationalizing COIN strategy and definitions

2009-03-02T07:24:00.001-08:00

In response to Janine Davidson's talk at the Combined Arms Center Senior Leadership Conference.

We could use a definition of where the military hands off command to USAID, and where USAID hands off command to State. This way everybody has something to work towards, a general set of goals, starting with a focus on security, moving to governance and economic infrastructure development, and THEN working on making it 'perfect' (a transparent and open democratic state).

Obviously these things all need to be worked on simultaneously, the key is where the focus is. From this we can then derive a series of clear, concise, and achievable goals at each stage of operations. Such distinctions would have to be made on a region-by-region basis. After OIF I, for example, the Kurdish regions were ready to be handed off to State almost immediately. Handing off command doesn't mean you pack up an leave, it just means the mission has transitioned to a new focus. Unless someone decides to start arming the USAID workers, the military will still have to show up in a big way.

Iraq and the Surge

2009-03-01T15:07:00.000-08:00

Just wanted to put up this map of various kinetic events across the occupation in Iraq. One can't help but be amazed at what the Coalition and the Iraqis were able to do, pulling that nation back from the abyss the way they did.

A SOFA, not a love seat.

2009-03-01T10:25:00.000-08:00

As most people in the foreign policy community expected, there wasn't much daylight between the President's plan and the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) already hammered out between the Bush Administration and the Iraqi government.

I am still concerned by the rush by a great many smart people to jump on the bandwagon regarding expectations of Iraq's security situation over the next year and a half or so. Everyone is making the assumption that the situation will continue to improve or stay roughly the same. Certainly, this is the most likely scenario. But what if security rapidly deteriorates? Especially if it does so in a direct correlation with troop level reductions, the war started under the previous administrations will now be the current administration's to lose. There are all kinds of very possible, if improbable, scenarios regarding large scale ethnic cleansing, accommodation of radicalists who use Iraq as a base to strike at moderate regimes throughout the region, etc

I'm not saying the withdrawal timeline is a bad idea. I think in a war among the people, it is vital that the people are aware of the broad strokes of the strategy, if not the operational details. Iraqi public opinion and US public opinion are bound together with regards to withdrawal. As Thomas P.M. Barnett is fond of saying, victory in Iraq will have been achieved when they vote to kick us out. All I'm saying is, if there is one vital lesson about Iraq, its that hope is not a plan. We need a strategy in place if things go bad.

Great Powers

2009-02-08T10:42:00.000-08:00

So I just received my pre-ordered copy of Great Powers: America and the World After Bush. A review is forthcoming, I'm somewhat swamped right now. But I am excited about it.

In the meantime, check out the question and answer article (pdf!) with the author, Thomas P.M. Barnett, who is pretty much my favorite International Relations thinker and writer. The interview itself is by Zenpundit, an excellent thinker and writer in his own right.

The British

2009-02-02T01:16:00.000-08:00

"The Americans are at war, the British are on operations."

http://www.economist.com/world/britain/displaystory.cfm?story_id=13022177

Most foreign militaries are fighting a war of discipline, rather than a war of survival. The US is unique in its ability to wage such conflicts (we LOVE violence, wherever the idea came from that Americans have a weak stomach for conflict, that idea has been proven wrong over and over again.) But there are countries for whom this IS a war of survival and whom we haven't yet tapped as a potential source of military capability. China and Russia both need the US to do well in Iraq and Afghanistan, and to prevent the rise of a hostile Iran. Pakistan and India have far more important contributions they can make than staring at each other across Kashmir.

In the mean time, the British military is having difficulty adapting, not as much from a lack of ingenuity as issues with institutionalism and budgeting that we have had an easier time overcoming.

The 119th Agribusiness Development Team

2009-01-10T05:12:00.000-08:00

The article speaks for itself:

BLOOMINGTON, Ind. (AP) - A 60-soldier Indiana National Guard unit is preparing for a mission to help farmers in Afghanistan boost production.

I hate to use the term, because its been done to death, but a big part of Stability Operations is the so-called, "Armed Social Work," that builds social, political, and economic bridges, not just among the local populace, but between the AOR and the road back home.

Meyers-Briggs is Unsubstantiated, unscientific, and statistically insignificant . . .

2009-01-10T04:44:00.000-08:00

That being said . . . I ran the blog through this type analyzer and got this:

ISTP

The independent and problem-solving type. They are especially attuned to the demands of the moment are masters of responding to challenges that arise spontaneously. They generally prefer to think things out for themselves and often avoid inter-personal conflicts.

The Mechanics enjoy working together with other independent and highly skilled people and often like seek fun and action both in their work and personal life. They enjoy adventure and risk such as in driving race cars or working as policemen and firefighters.

Seems pretty accurate, but like I said over at Small Wars Journal, these things are written using terms so general, I might as well ask Miss Cleo to read my blog . . .

Something I'm Working On.

2009-01-09T21:20:00.000-08:00

I have been trying to figure out ways to improve the actual organization of things like the National Security Council. This is a rough draft which incorporates the Regional Commands as implementers of Foreign Policy. This particular chart tries to balance out regional implementation with an overarching advisory and coordination board.

I'm on a roll tonight.

2009-01-08T02:07:00.000-08:00

Ok kiddies, lately I have seen more and more people suggesting that the US Military is taking over foreign policy. And frankly, this is driving me nuts.

It seems to be historical revisionism at best to suggest that the military was ever not the key foreign policy tool of the United States.

Great White Fleet
The Barbary Coast
Gunboat Diplomacy in the Banana Republics
. . . and in China too. The Sand Pebbles (1966) anyone?
Civilize em' with a Krag

Those are just a few I could come up with off the top of my head. But seriously, I have even heard someone who generally isn't a tinfoil-hatter suggest Gates is merely using COIN strategy to move the military into things like foreign development projects. Gates isn't after more power, the dude has been trying to retire since the day he got the job. He is doing his job and filling in the staggering mission gap between the State Department and Department of Defense that is right now being occupied by a ragtag group of:

Military COIN strategists
Academics in the social sciences
Private Contractors
NGOs
USAID FSO's
Some guys from Army Special Forces (the light side ones, not the dark side crowd).

Honestly, you probably wouldn't be able to fill a good-sized Hotel Conference Hall if you got them all together. And yet this is the most important job in the 21st Century, these are the guys that are going to stand on the seem between war and peace and try to drag nation-states away from the brink. So excuse the hell out of Gates for trying to make sure this job gets done. Gates isn't talking about the militarization of foreign policy, he's talking about the diplomatization of what has historically been a military-led foreign policy.

Why isn't State doing this job? Because State is all about working with existing Nation-states, and their institutional mindset is at the embassy in Paris, not Baghdad. I like this quote by Nagl and Fick over at ForeignPolicy.com:

This imperative to get out among the people extends to U.S. civilians as well. U.S. Embassy staff are almost completely forbidden from moving around Kabul on their own. Diplomacy is, of course, about relationships, and rules that discourage relationships fundamentally limit the ability of American diplomats to do their jobs. The mission in Afghanistan is to stabilize the country, not to secure the embassy.

The part that I made bold should be tattooed on some peoples foreheads. And honestly, I like the idea of a separate organization for each part of the Defense, Development, and Diplomacy blend. The so-called, "3D" Approach. Department of Defense gets shrunk, State Department stays the same minus USAID, and a new Department of International Development built on the guys I listed above gets a hefty chunk of change. Use the existing Unified Command regions, each Command has a Presidentially appointed Director, and a Deputy Director from DoD, DoS, and DID. Good luck prying anything away from Secretary of State Clinton.

Oh well, a kid can dream can't he?

Join the Mobile Infantry!

2009-01-08T01:48:00.001-08:00

Why no National Call to Service? Why not empower the youth of this nation and motivate them to be part of something larger than themselves? The President has not once, not ever, asked for people to join Americorps, Peace Corps, or the US Military, despite informing us rather consistently that we are indeed at war. This has always bugged me, why not ask for volunteers? Instead, the only thing he has ever asked of the American public is to shop. Had the president asked for people to join the military when he addressed the nation that evening on September 11th, 2001, the recruiting offices would have been overwhelmed. Instead we simply overwhelmed our creditors, and shopped away.

AFRICOM starts sneaking into Darfur . . .

2009-01-07T22:53:00.001-08:00

http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=59831

The term, "quiet escalation" isnt generally applied to peacekeeping, but that seems to be what is happening here. Its difficult for other countries to support the US in this endeavor because of national sovereignty issues that apply to so many of our partners and even allies. But gradual escalation of peacekeeping, especially if we remain primarily a logistical partner, might be more palatable to the global community, which does want to see something positive happen, it just doesn't know what. It is truly time for the US to return to the leadership role in these sorts of affairs.

On Armor

2009-01-06T15:33:00.000-08:00

Something I realized the other day, even though its been staring me in the face for a long time. The requirements in regards to force protection and armor are much, much higher doing the SysAdmin work (to use Barnetts phrase to describe counterinsurgency, stability, and security operations) then they are for actual combat operations. It seems obvious when you look at it, but it can be hard to overcome the conventional wisdom that you need more armor for war, and less for stability ops.

In combat, mobility and stealth play an important role in force protection. But how do you maneuver against an enemy when your mission is to guard a police station, or a tribal elders meeting, or a construction project? You really don't, you are out there, exposed for all to see, no concealment, no mobility, so you all you can do is rely on cover. Armored vehicles, giant blast walls, stand off distance created by barriers. These are tools of the SysAdmin Force, not a force whose focus is on actual combat.

This same concept would apply for forces in Land, Sea, and Air. And it illustrates why tanks are still needed to control key points in a counterinsurgency campaign, when conventional wisdom would suggest their effectiveness to be poor at best. As the Navy moves into the Littorals, the requirement for Force Protection rises even higher than for it blue water ships. Why was body armor not a problm until the Occupation of Iraq started? Why were unarmored Hummvee's good enough for the initial invasion but inadequate for the follow on?

Specifically I'm thinking about the LCS, which is a SysAdmin boat in its mission if ever there was one, and its speed vs. mobility trade-off dramatically in favor of speed. Unless the LCS is going to be chasing down pirate skiffs single handedly, which seems unlikely, speed isn't the critical factor, force protection is. Destroyers and Cruisers need to be fast on the basis of their need for combat maneuverability, the LCS doesn't need to outrun a torpedo, its going to have to sit on station within visual range of shore while it supports RHIBs or logistical operations on shore and needs to be loaded up with force protection measures.

On the Army side, think about the FCS, which is billed as a means of replacing the Stryker Brigades. But the Strykers aren't what needs replacing, its the Abrams in the role of an armor asset for a rapidly deploying combat force. This may sound like crazy talk, but I say, keep the Abrams in reduced numbers for the SysAdmin, and push the FCS for the Leviathan. FCS offers greater mobility with less force protection, so its fundamentally a maneuver warfare asset.

New Foreign Policy Webpage

2009-01-06T01:28:00.000-08:00

Absolutely marvelous, with some of the best journalists and regional experts out there on their blogging staff. Go see it now.

I especially enjoy Tom Ricks on Defense and Marc Lynch of 'Abu Aardvark' fame commenting on Southwest Asian Affairs. I'm still pouring over it, but that place is a goldmine for sure. And they all start off berating John Bolton's op-ed, and if there is a single way to get on my good side, its probably with berating one of Bolton's absurdly irrational and uninformed rants. Either that or with food.

Zakaria, not to be confused with the Kurdish pop star

2008-12-13T02:07:00.001-08:00

One of my favorite columnists, the intelligent, articulate, multicultural counterpoint to Lou Dobbsian xenophobia and isolationism, Fareed Zakaria at Newsweek, has a new column out asking the Obama administration to make the formation of a National Grand Strategy a top Foreign Policy objective. The "Diplomacy by CNN" approach, where by US policy objectives are picked from news headlines, is just too reactive, whereas a Grand Strategy can unite us, and give us a real objective to pursue and work towards with our allies.

In fact, the whole Newsweek for 8 DEC 08 is like a 21st Century Foreign Policy Primer, balanced well with some great commentators, most of whom I agree with, some whom I don't. Go get it. Now.

Who's Your City - Richard Florida's regional based analysis of Globalization

2008-12-13T01:02:00.000-08:00

David Eaves, who created this awesome map of Firefox pledges mashed with the Pentagon's New Map by Barnett, has struck again.

Here is an awesome new map comparing the "Global Village" concept, which I crudely summarize as development and innovation led by the Mega-Cities of the world; and their presence in relation to Barnett's map. He also has a great summary of the three different levels of analysis offered in turn by Friedman, Barnett, and Florida.

The 3D approach? (Diplomacy, Defense, Development) The Villages cooperate to defend each other and build new ones in the "Gap." All of which allows them to make more money, effectively incentivizing growth and collective security.

In the Navy . . .

2008-12-11T15:41:00.000-08:00

Amphibs are where it's at, I would support cutting the carrier force by about 4 in return for 6 ship increase in Major Amphibs (LHA/LHD), and the LPDs (pictured here) and LSDs to go along with them.

What the Amphibs are for the US is what the USS Enterprise (the spaceship, not the aircraft carrier) is for the Federation. They provide incredible capabilities for rapid intervention in conflicts and humanitarian crisis, and the most effective way to stop a conflict is to nip it in the bud. An Amphib has the engineering, medical, and just enough combat capability to deal with a brewing conflict before it goes high-intensity.

The joke goes, how many aircraft carriers do you need? Just one, but you need it every where, all the time, with better reliability, carriers operational availability is improving enough that we can certainly afford to reduce the number, especially if we add a few Apmhibs to compensate. Amphibs also have additional usage beyond military, just look at the USS Kearsarge deployment in South America, all medical-related.

This goes along with my wider idea that we should have two military forces, a small task force or Joint Strike Force that is sized to take down the military of the largest potential nation-state competitor (nuclear powers don't count, its just not worth it). This force would be mainly built on Naval and Air Force airpower, and have all the cool whiz-bang toys. Abrams go here, FCS go here, F22/F35, CVNs, Subs, etc.

The other, much larger force would be a Counterinsurgency-Stabilization force that responds to Humanitarian and Intrastate conflicts. It would be mainly designed to stop states from failing or rebuild failed ones (including post-US intervention). It would primarily be based on Army and Marine infantry/engineer/civil affairs forces, and it gets the not so sexy armored cars, language, and cultural training. Strykers go here, MRAPs go here, UAVs and COIN birds like Super Tucanos, Amphibs, LCS, etc.

The only way to protect these two capabilities is to split them apart, otherwise we'll constantly be swinging from one side to the other depending on whose in charge. We need a warrior ethos, and we need a nation-builder.

The New Foreign Policy Team

2008-12-02T13:03:00.001-08:00

National Security Adviser: James Jones
Department of Defense: Bob Gates - yay!
State Department: Hillary Clinton
Department of Homeland Security: Janet Napolitano
US ambassador to the UN: Susan Rice

Congratulations, all very respectable choices, and good luck, you guys have more on your shoulders than anyone can possibly imagine, but I'm sure by now you know that.

Validation!

2008-11-14T11:43:00.000-08:00

SWJ Op-ed suggesting that in the struggle between the Constabulary-Advisory Force and the War-fighting force, we need both.

Feels good . . .

The War Caste

2008-10-27T00:18:00.000-07:00

The disconnect between military and civil society should be cause for great concern on both sides. The level of communication between the two has quite possibly never been lower, in spite of this Long War and unprecedented civilian access to information. Somehow, the military and their families and the general American public have divorced. The average American's military knowledge is more abysmal than their general political knowledge. The two sides look across the great chasm at each other with a mixture of curiosity and contempt.

To civilians, the military has been mystified, vilified, or enshrined in a sacred shroud of secrecy, often all of the above. It is too large, too complex, too secretive to be understood, and thus civilian responses range between hero-worship and paranoia. To the civilian mind, Special Operations Forces are running around the Federally Administered Tribal Areas in Pakistan by themselves like Jack Bauer, shooting, maiming, torturing whoever they want.

To the military, they and their families bare 100% of the costs of this conflict, which a majority of the schizophrenic American public supported before they decided not to support it. Civilians are at best held in mild contempt. At worst viewed as sheep to be herded and shown the error of their ways.

The military doesn't rule this country, we must be helpful servants, always subordinate to our civilian masters. And we must be advocates. Just as there are organizations of doctors who advocate nationalized health care, or organizations of scientists to advocate the concept of Global Warming, it is our job to respectfully bring discussions of grand strategy and corresponding force structure to the national civic debate. The only difference is that we do not have the option to disobey or defy our civilian leaders once they give an order.

If we in the military fail in this task, we can expect time and time again for civilians to jump on the bandwagon when we say we can complete a mission, and immediately jump off when the going gets tough. And up to this point, we have failed in this task. We must not lose the hearts and minds of the American people, for they, just as easily as the Iraqi or Afghan peoples, can veto our efforts to complete the mission they assigned us.

When you assume, you make an ass out of you and me . . .

2008-10-20T09:07:00.000-07:00

I posted over at ComingAnarchy.com regarding basic assumptions being made in US policy options toward Tehran:
With the vast array of knowledge and experience I command as an undergraduate Political Science Major, I will attempt to answer these questions:

Is Iran after the bomb?
a)I think they want to know that if they needed to make one, they could. They have the ballistic missile capability worked out (sort of), they’re going to get the enriched uranium (sort of). They’ll study bomb design, and maybe even machine the conventional parts of the weapon. I believe they’ll go for something like the Japan or Israeli approach to nuclear deterrence. Either getting them and not admitting it, or developing the capability but not assembling it until they see an unfriendly UNSC Resolution on the horizon.

Would Iran strike first?
a)The perception that they would strike first seems to be built upon the idea that the Iranian government is too irrational to be deterred, in spite of any evidence that they have ever acted with anything less than careful planning and completely rational strategic planning. These guys invented chess, and have the luxury of strategic leadership in the government that don’t have to worry about getting kicked out of office. The mullahs are a political organization with a religious ideology, not a religious organization with a political ideology.

Would Iran keep control of the bomb if they got it, or would it be at risk of slipping into hands of unreliable or irrational actors?
a) Iran knows who they deal with, and they want control of everything in their domain. Whether its the military, the Strait of Hormuz, or their own population. If they get the bomb they aren’t going to give it to someone they can’t control. They know that no matter how much plausible deniability they have, any nuclear attack in Southwest Asia is going to result in Tehran becoming the worlds largest parking lot. They aren’t going to give it to the IRGC, or the Hezzies, or Hamas, or their slightly inbred second cousin. Those things are all good to have around, but you can’t completely control them. I wouldn’t be surprised if they tried to maintain direct control over them within the Revolutionary Council.

The fundamental assertion driving all three questions is that Iran is somehow on some kind of irrational drive for nuclear power. Iran went for the bomb because we took down the country on either side of them, and control the Gulf below them, things are scary from their point of view. The assertion of the irrationality of their government is only justified if they are indeed a religious, apolitical organization which puts ideology over the most basic concern of any organization: survival. Yet this belief is commonly held despite an astounding lack of evidence to support it. We all fear what we don’t know, fear leads to anger, anger leads to hate, etc . . . Not a proper basis for a policy decision.

Talking to the Taliban?

2008-10-10T04:28:00.000-07:00

Sure enough, Gates is talking about "reconciliation" with the Taliban. The situation is complicated by an indeterminable relationship with Al-Qa-ida and a fractured organizational structure. According to the Rand Corporation: 50% of insurgencies end with negotiations, 25% end with insurgent victory, and 19% end with a military defeat of the insurgency. Given that getting more resources for the Afghanistan effort is like pulling teeth, it is doubtful a military solution is possible. That leaves us with talking to the Taliban, who despite their rhetoric, are extremely concentrated in a specific ethnic group. Not just Pashtun, but Dari Pashtun. I think the possibility of a negotiated "Tribal Region" as exists in Pakistan, is the most probable outcome. In exchange for not actively seeking to topple the Kabul government, Karzai will let them be. The key for the US and NATO will be to seek an addendum to that agreement that makes it explicitly clear that harboring Al-Qa'ida is not ok. Going after them is going to get harder and rely more and more on covert means.

A Taliban Awakening?

2008-10-06T03:47:00.000-07:00

Saudi brokered peace talks taking place between the Afghan government and the Taliban. The Taliban additionally openly renounce Al Qaeda. What I suspect is that a few clans in the Taliban are negotiating, and battle lines are being drawn amongst the tribes in the region, some moving towards government acceptance and fighting Al Qaeda, and some becoming more closely aligned with Al Qaeda.

The Department of Defense and the Department of Security and Foreign Development

2008-10-02T17:53:00.000-07:00

The Active Duty Army will have 48 Brigade Combat Teams by 2013 arrayed as such:

19 Heavy Brigade Combat Teams (20 if you count 3rd ACR, which is close enough for our purposes)

6 Stryker Brigade Combat Teams

13 Infantry Brigade Combat Teams

6 Airborne Brigade Combat Teams

4 Air Assault Brigade Combat Teams

Additionally, the Marines have 12 Regimental Combat Teams

Grand Total 48+12= 60 Brigades

I see the HBCT's optimized for high-intensity conflict, the SBCT's optimized for mid-intensity conflict, and IBCT's becoming more and more optimized for mid-to-low intensity conflict. This is the way it should be. Marine RCTs can be structured to fight in high-intensity conflicts, but the do their best work at the mid-to-low level, their organic equipment typically being more comparable to a Stryker BCT. In the future, Stryker and Infantry BCT's will have to integrate peacekeeping and nation building capabilities at the unit level, this will entail the attachment of:

NGO's (UN, WHO)
Coalition allies (UK&Friends, EU, China, India, whoever wants to come along)
Public sector orgs (State Dept, USAID, Peace Corps)
Private sector - Blackwater, KBR, Halliburton, choke on it hippies, they're here to stay.
Foreign Direct Investment - It will start with Security and Infrastructure contracts directly with the coalition, but if security improves enough, the investment starts to flow and then a Less-Developed Country becomes a Low-Cost Country, ripe for rapid economic growth that is the pre-condition for any lasting peace.

These new elements will be controversial and will blur the lines between military and civilian, overseas and posse comitatus, but they are necessary, and given the current trajectory, inevitable. I would posit that a reduction in the number of Heavy Brigade Combat Teams is necessary both from a strategic and fiscal point of view. An increase in the now proven and accepted Stryker Brigades wouldn't be a bad thing. The reduction in HBCT's will reduce the cost of FCS, and the $ saved can be used for more Strykers.

I propose developing the entire combat forces of the United States along a delineation between Forced-Entry Capable, and Follow-on units. High-End assets go with the Forced-Entry critters, Cheap and plentiful follow behind them.

Proposed Force Structure:

Forced Entry Capable Teams (23+8) Brigades Total) -

Stays in DoD
6 Airborne Brigade Combat Teams and 4 Air Assault Brigade Combat Teams by Air
10 Heavy Brigade Combat Teams (+ 8 National Guard HBCTs) by Land
3 Marine Expeditionary Brigades and their naval support assets by Sea
Carrier Strike Groups, SSNs, SSGNs, Surface combatants DDG or larger
F-22's F-35's, B-1's, B-2's, etc
Kicks in the door, grabs the bad guy, Mugabe, Kim Jong-Il, etc, and then pulls out, usually in less than a month.

Security and Development Force (37+19) Brigades Total) -

Moves to a Department of Foreign Security and Development that unites diplomatic, security, public, and private development and stabilization centers under one flag in a one effort.
12 Stryker BCTs (+ 1 National Guard Stryker BCTs)
16 Infantry BCTs (+ 18 National Guard Infantry BCTs)
9 (The Remaining Marine RCT's)
LPD's and LSD's to support the humanitarian, peacekeeping, disaster-response, etc, Littoral Combat Ships
UAV's, UAV's, UAV's, Airlift, Airlift, Airlift
Follows immediately behind the Forced-Entry force, even sharing command and support structures with the DoD forces, is handed off command when security reaches a threshold (enemy can no longer operate beyond the company level) on a regional basis. Stays "until the job is done." If we get good at this, it doesn't have to be 5 years later, it can be a single year-long tour.

This delineation allows for a better management of conflicts without cutting any single branch completely out of the DoD budget. I believe they all have something to contribute, though obviously the majority of the effort will shift over time to supporting the Security and Development Force, which is simply an extension of the fact that we are running out of plausible nation-states that could challenge us and simply shifting focus to expanding economic connectivity. As Gates pointed out, where in the world would a plausible conventional conflict occur?

2008-10-01T23:27:00.000-07:00

Two great posts regarding Future Force Composition:

First, Galrahn discusses the make up of the Navy.

Then Barnett has highlights of Gates speech at the National Defense University.

Pakistan

2008-09-26T16:40:00.000-07:00

The conflict in Afghanistan will be decided by how we handle Pakistan. They simultaneously kill hundreds of Taliban, and shoot at us during cross-border raids. The ISI has Taliban leanings, the military has military leanings, and the civilian government has corrupt leanings.

While many have been in denial, Afghanistan was always a regional conflict, the failure of ISAF to see it as such has only resulted in a successful ouster of the Taliban in 2001 culminating with their dramatic resurgence.

Jammous!

2008-09-26T14:50:00.001-07:00

With security rapidly improving in Iraq, we see many hard-charging combat units transitioning into things like helping locals care for livestock. How can we get better at this? Integrate NGO's at the BCT level once security improves to a defined level? Something to ponder...

Does this mean freighters can mount .50 cals now?

2008-09-26T14:25:00.000-07:00

Galrahn over at Information Dissemination is talking about a US Navy statement saying that it can't/won't protect all civilian commerce transiting the Gulf of Aden. Which begs the question, who will? The cost to the global economy is substantial, as it is one of the most heavily trafficked straights in the world, and yet the Navy seems to feel that fighting piracy is below them. What in ze hell? The Navy seems to be in full retreat from the littoral region, even though that is the Naval equivalent of counterinsurgency warfare. Previously, they told the Marines they weren't getting any closer than 25nm to shore. So who is going to bare the cost/risk? With insurance costs on shipping skyrocketing I can't imagine it will be long before we see the rise of a "Blackwater Navy." Congressional hearings and civilian NGO outrage will be soon to follow no doubt. But that is the price you pay, if there is a demand going unfulfilled, it won't be long before the market creates a supply. Maybe I should strap on my eye patch and try to get a Letter of Marque from Congress?

Standing up . . .

2008-09-25T22:12:00.000-07:00

The Iraqi military, border, and police forces are starting to approach self-sufficiency in the most important area, logistics! Between this and the provincial election law finally getting passed, the way is being paved to shift fire from Iraq back to the, "West Virginia of the Islamic World." (With apologies to the Islamic World.)

Things to come . . .

2008-09-25T21:22:00.000-07:00

Starting this coming Monday, I'll begin discussing future rolls of each military branch. I'm going to try and throw a lot out there just to get the ball rolling. I know more about things Army, Marine, and SOF related, less so when it comes to the Navy and Air Force. Again, the key is to define the role within the context of a national grand strategy which focuses both on deterring or initiating a regime change in rogue actors, and providing stability and humanitarian aid everywhere else. While we are currently seeing the majority of the Stability Force growing within the Army and Marines, each branch has something it can contribute.

On Georgia

2008-09-25T15:33:00.000-07:00

One quick note on the recent conflict in Georgia, while many people see this as the collapse of the Core-Gap theory of expanding Globalization, I think it is telling that despite the fact that Georgia is a clear ally of the United States, at no point did we ever offer military support against Russia. Regardless of who you see as the provocateur in that conflict, and I will be quick to point out that Georgian democracy is at best, wanting, the fact is that the Cold War military dynamic with Russia hasn't changed. They still have nukes. If we do have a conflict with Russia, it will once again be by proxy. And the constabulary force is better suited to such a conflict. The only nations we can reasonably expect to go to war with on their own territory, (whether perceived or actual) are those without nuclear weapons. Hence why I include the non-nuclear caveat in my force sizing argument. The only way to persuade a nuclear enabled state at an acceptable cost is to use diplomacy to bring them into the international system, economics to undermine the base of their power. Remember Putin's soul? It looked a lot better before oil went above $100 a barrel.

Inaugural Post

2008-09-25T13:32:00.000-07:00

BLUF:

In the study of modern warfare, a bifurcation has arisen between those who believe we must structure and deploy our military to combat primarily non-state actors, primarily in the form of counterinsurgencies, and those who believe we should align our forces to face traditional state opponents. I believe that this is a false dichotomy, and that as the only military power with a truly global reach, it is our responsibility to provide both options to policy makers.

First, how this all got started, LTG Caldwell says it much better than I could.

GEN Omar Bradley once stated that "Amateurs talk tactics, professionals study logistics." The weakest link in the logistical base of the US military, or the military of any truly democratic state, will always be the political will of its citizenry. For this reason, it is vital that we include civilians in any discussion about the future structure and purpose of our Armed Forces. I offer this blog as an open forum for the discussion of anything from the tactical (counterinsurgency, maneuver warfare, special operations) to the operational ("The Long War," AFRICOM) to the strategic (procurement, force structure, forward deployment).

In this discussion I find several publications to be of particular utility:

- Thomas P.M. Barnett: The Pentagon's New Map, Blueprint for Action, and the soon to be published: Great Powers.

- Thomas L. Friedman: The Lexus and the Olive Tree, The World is Flat

- Combined Arms Center: FM 3-0: Operations, The Counterinsurgency Field Manual, FM 3-24 and Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5

-and many more, but these form the basis of my personal understanding of global conflict and the prescription for its cure . . . I welcome additional submissions for my perusing pleasure.

Additionally, there is a great spectrum of my fellow Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, and Airmen, whom I turn to as sources of information, insight, and experience. And there are of course other sources such as blogs, traditional media outlets, and my own twisted imagination.

For those not squared away on current military affairs, there are essentially two schools of thought on the direction of future conflict. They are generally, but by no means entirely, divided along generational lines, with an older, Cold War-era group seeing a world where the great powers of the planet must inevitably clash in tradtional military struggles, and a younger, mostly junior and senior officer crowd that sees the future of the military lying in stability operations, conterinsurgency, and humanitarian aid, all with the purpose of reducing regional conflicts that could scale up into larger full-fledged wars. These distinctions rule over how they see aquisitions, research, force structure, pretty much everything that comprises the military. If you believe in the Stability Operations crowd, you want Amphibious Warfare ships, UAVs, and tons of boots on the ground to do everything from handing out aid to tracking down terrorists. If you are a Westphalian Warrior, you want Tanks, Subs, F-22s, all complemented with a healthy serving of Nukes on the side.

I believe that we must have a force for both types of warfare. One that can eliminate state actors by force, and one that can work with NGOs, coalition partners, and local leaders to target violent non-state actors, build up local security infrastructure, and pave the way for economic development that eventually improves quality of life. I believe that we need a small, conventional force that is "sized" to take down the armed forces of the most militarily powerful non-nuclear enabled "rogue" state. (currently Iran) And a larger constabulary force that can act to spread security in any part of the world destabilized by disaster, be it natural or man-made.

This blog is a discussion about how to best achieve those two forces, as they are what is expected of us as a military force by both the world and the American taxpayer. I offer this basic outline only as a starting point, and welcome discussion, including that which suggests we go completely one way or the other. Who knows, maybe you'll change my mind.