Tuesday, January 6, 2009

On Armor


Something I realized the other day, even though its been staring me in the face for a long time. The requirements in regards to force protection and armor are much, much higher doing the SysAdmin work (to use Barnetts phrase to describe counterinsurgency, stability, and security operations) then they are for actual combat operations. It seems obvious when you look at it, but it can be hard to overcome the conventional wisdom that you need more armor for war, and less for stability ops.

In combat, mobility and stealth play an important role in force protection. But how do you maneuver against an enemy when your mission is to guard a police station, or a tribal elders meeting, or a construction project? You really don't, you are out there, exposed for all to see, no concealment, no mobility, so you all you can do is rely on cover. Armored vehicles, giant blast walls, stand off distance created by barriers. These are tools of the SysAdmin Force, not a force whose focus is on actual combat.

This same concept would apply for forces in Land, Sea, and Air. And it illustrates why tanks are still needed to control key points in a counterinsurgency campaign, when conventional wisdom would suggest their effectiveness to be poor at best. As the Navy moves into the Littorals, the requirement for Force Protection rises even higher than for it blue water ships. Why was body armor not a problm until the Occupation of Iraq started? Why were unarmored Hummvee's good enough for the initial invasion but inadequate for the follow on?

Specifically I'm thinking about the LCS, which is a SysAdmin boat in its mission if ever there was one, and its speed vs. mobility trade-off dramatically in favor of speed. Unless the LCS is going to be chasing down pirate skiffs single handedly, which seems unlikely, speed isn't the critical factor, force protection is. Destroyers and Cruisers need to be fast on the basis of their need for combat maneuverability, the LCS doesn't need to outrun a torpedo, its going to have to sit on station within visual range of shore while it supports RHIBs or logistical operations on shore and needs to be loaded up with force protection measures.

On the Army side, think about the FCS, which is billed as a means of replacing the Stryker Brigades. But the Strykers aren't what needs replacing, its the Abrams in the role of an armor asset for a rapidly deploying combat force. This may sound like crazy talk, but I say, keep the Abrams in reduced numbers for the SysAdmin, and push the FCS for the Leviathan. FCS offers greater mobility with less force protection, so its fundamentally a maneuver warfare asset.

New Foreign Policy Webpage

Absolutely marvelous, with some of the best journalists and regional experts out there on their blogging staff. Go see it now.

I especially enjoy Tom Ricks on Defense and Marc Lynch of 'Abu Aardvark' fame commenting on Southwest Asian Affairs.  I'm still pouring over it, but that place is a goldmine for sure.  And they all start off berating John Bolton's op-ed, and if there is a single way to get on my good side, its probably with berating one of Bolton's absurdly irrational and uninformed rants.  Either that or with food.

Saturday, December 13, 2008

Zakaria, not to be confused with the Kurdish pop star


One of my favorite columnists, the intelligent, articulate, multicultural counterpoint to Lou Dobbsian xenophobia and isolationism, Fareed Zakaria at Newsweek, has a new column out asking the Obama administration to make the formation of a National Grand Strategy a top Foreign Policy objective. The "Diplomacy by CNN" approach, where by US policy objectives are picked from news headlines, is just too reactive, whereas a Grand Strategy can unite us, and give us a real objective to pursue and work towards with our allies.

In fact, the whole Newsweek for 8 DEC 08 is like a 21st Century Foreign Policy Primer, balanced well with some great commentators, most of whom I agree with, some whom I don't. Go get it. Now.

Who's Your City - Richard Florida's regional based analysis of Globalization

David Eaves, who created this awesome map of Firefox pledges mashed with the Pentagon's New Map by Barnett, has struck again.

Here is an awesome new map comparing the "Global Village" concept, which I crudely summarize as development and innovation led by the Mega-Cities of the world; and their presence in relation to Barnett's map. He also has a great summary of the three different levels of analysis offered in turn by Friedman, Barnett, and Florida.

The 3D approach? (Diplomacy, Defense, Development) The Villages cooperate to defend each other and build new ones in the "Gap." All of which allows them to make more money, effectively incentivizing growth and collective security.

Thursday, December 11, 2008

In the Navy . . .


Amphibs are where it's at, I would support cutting the carrier force by about 4 in return for 6 ship increase in Major Amphibs (LHA/LHD), and the LPDs (pictured here) and LSDs to go along with them.

What the Amphibs are for the US is what the USS Enterprise (the spaceship, not the aircraft carrier) is for the Federation. They provide incredible capabilities for rapid intervention in conflicts and humanitarian crisis, and the most effective way to stop a conflict is to nip it in the bud. An Amphib has the engineering, medical, and just enough combat capability to deal with a brewing conflict before it goes high-intensity.

The joke goes, how many aircraft carriers do you need? Just one, but you need it every where, all the time, with better reliability, carriers operational availability is improving enough that we can certainly afford to reduce the number, especially if we add a few Apmhibs to compensate. Amphibs also have additional usage beyond military, just look at the USS Kearsarge deployment in South America, all medical-related.

This goes along with my wider idea that we should have two military forces, a small task force or Joint Strike Force that is sized to take down the military of the largest potential nation-state competitor (nuclear powers don't count, its just not worth it). This force would be mainly built on Naval and Air Force airpower, and have all the cool whiz-bang toys. Abrams go here, FCS go here, F22/F35, CVNs, Subs, etc.

The other, much larger force would be a Counterinsurgency-Stabilization force that responds to Humanitarian and Intrastate conflicts. It would be mainly designed to stop states from failing or rebuild failed ones (including post-US intervention). It would primarily be based on Army and Marine infantry/engineer/civil affairs forces, and it gets the not so sexy armored cars, language, and cultural training. Strykers go here, MRAPs go here, UAVs and COIN birds like Super Tucanos, Amphibs, LCS, etc.

The only way to protect these two capabilities is to split them apart, otherwise we'll constantly be swinging from one side to the other depending on whose in charge. We need a warrior ethos, and we need a nation-builder.

Tuesday, December 2, 2008

The New Foreign Policy Team


  • National Security Adviser: James Jones
  • Department of Defense: Bob Gates - yay!
  • State Department: Hillary Clinton
  • Department of Homeland Security: Janet Napolitano
  • US ambassador to the UN: Susan Rice

Congratulations, all very respectable choices, and good luck, you guys have more on your shoulders than anyone can possibly imagine, but I'm sure by now you know that.

Friday, November 14, 2008

Validation!


SWJ Op-ed suggesting that in the struggle between the Constabulary-Advisory Force and the War-fighting force, we need both.

Feels good . . .