House Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces

That's kind of a mouthful, but basically, in the House there is a committee on the Armed Services. Within this committee is a subcommittee whose responsibility is the oversight of the US Navy, US Marine Corps, and US Coast Guard. Well they had one of this blog's favorite strategic thinkers over to testify on Thursday, and a lot of important things got said there. I wasn't there personally, but Thomas P.M. Barnett testified and has a couple blog posts about the hearing on his weblog if you want to clicky the link on the left.

Notable was the agreement that the budget will be reduced. Naturally, there were differing opinions on where the cuts should come from. This blogger supports a drastic decrease in Carrier Strike Groups. Currently the requirement is 12 Carrier Strike Groups, and 11 Expeditionary Strike Groups. The standard 1/3 operating ratio means that only 4 Carriers are deployable at any given time. That is an awful lot of power concentrated on very few platforms. And any risk to these platforms in necessarily utterly unacceptable. Expeditionary Strike Groups are divided among 3 major vessel types in addition to their surface combatant escorts:

• LHA/LHD's are like smaller aircraft carriers that bring helicopter and fixed-wing close air support.
• LPD's carry tanks, vehicles, and the hovercraft we use to put them ashore. The big ship in the center of the picture above is a San Antonio-class LPD.
  
• LSD's carry additional hovercraft and equipment. The ship in the lead of the formation in the picture is a Whidbey Island-class LSD.
  

This means that for 11 Expeditionary Strike Groups you actually get 33 major platforms that can spread US influence and operate with Global Partnership Stations, support Marines or other ground forces, hunt pirates, or look for terrorists. The only thing they can't do is carry the larger fixed-wing aircraft needed for long range air support. At the beginning of the century the battleship replaced the dreadnought. Following Pearl Harbor, the Battleship was replaced by the Aircraft Carrier as the primary means of force projection. And even though it never fired a shot, the real key to naval power projection during the Cold War was the nuclear submarine, both attack and ballistic missile types. Today, it is the Amphibious warship that most represents the means by which we project power and influence. They alone, among major naval platforms can exert influence in the littoral regions. In combination with the LCS, they provide a powerful tool for exerting control in the most important regions of the world's ocean's, the places where the people are. For this reason, I believe the number of Carriers should be reduced from 12 to 6, and the number of Amphibious warships expanded from 33 to 45, for a total of 15 Expeditionary Strike Groups.

Used Ship salesman?

An interesting idea being floated ::groan:: by the likes of Bob Work and Thomas P.M. Barnett is to sell LCS to developing navies and coast guards around the world after we use them. Not only does it help us recoup some of the procurement cost, but it helps build a truly global cooperative coast guard in the spirit of the National Maritime Strategy. I think it's is a brilliant example of how we can export security and help to stabilize the global system in a more meaningful manner than simply selling more guns.

Does this mean freighters can mount .50 cals now?

Galrahn over at Information Dissemination is talking about a US Navy statement saying that it can't/won't protect all civilian commerce transiting the Gulf of Aden. Which begs the question, who will? The cost to the global economy is substantial, as it is one of the most heavily trafficked straights in the world, and yet the Navy seems to feel that fighting piracy is below them. What in ze hell? The Navy seems to be in full retreat from the littoral region, even though that is the Naval equivalent of counterinsurgency warfare. Previously, they told the Marines they weren't getting any closer than 25nm to shore. So who is going to bare the cost/risk? With insurance costs on shipping skyrocketing I can't imagine it will be long before we see the rise of a "Blackwater Navy." Congressional hearings and civilian NGO outrage will be soon to follow no doubt. But that is the price you pay, if there is a demand going unfulfilled, it won't be long before the market creates a supply. Maybe I should strap on my eye patch and try to get a Letter of Marque from Congress?