A discussion of wars big and small, long and short. The thoughts, views, pictures, comments expressed herein no way represent the views of the U.S. Army, DOD, or the United States Government. These are my thoughts and views unless otherwise stated.
Tuesday, March 31, 2009
Used Ship salesman?
Wednesday, March 18, 2009
Our Supranational World . . .
With global trade talks somewhat stalled and trade protectionism on the rise, much to the chargin of anyone familiar with economics or the history of recessions, I wonder if regional trade organizations will take a front seat for the next 5-10 years or so until the US can get back on track as a leader in spreading the global community.
While coordinated global action is important, especially from groups like the G-20, regional organizations have an advantage in that the danger of sudden exposure to the global economy is lessened by first having to compete on a regional level. Countries that share borders also tend to share other economic and political interests, making faster coordination and integration possible.
I also think building such organizations should be a primary US foreign policy tool, rogue regimes are much less likely to continue their shennanigans when they have to answer to their regional partners rather than just the Great Imperialist Power. It's hard to deny, for example, that the Southern African countries have been able to exert more influence than the US in Zimbabwe.
Iran - admittance to either the Gulf Cooperation Council or the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation could be a powerful carrot to regulate Iranian behavior through economic sanctions or free trade.
North Korea - would be hard pressed not to accept access to a not yet existant East Asian Economic Community. The Chinese and South Koreans would both put a lot of pressure on them to lower their isolationist stance.
Cuba - admittance to CariCom in exchange for Human Rights improvements . . .
Pakistan

Also, according to the Pashtun Peace Forum, Pakistani's in the Tribal regions don't totally hate the drone strikes:
-- Do the militant organizations get damaged due to drone attacks? (Yes 60%, No 40%)-- Do you see drone attacks bringing about fear and terror in the common people? (Yes 45%, No 55%)
-- Do you think the drones are accurate in their strikes? (Yes 52%, No 48%)
-- Do you think anti-American feelings in the area increased due to drone attacks recently? (Yes 42%, No 58%)
-- Should Pakistan military carry out targeted strikes at the militant organizations? (Yes 70%, No 30%)
-- Do the militant organizations get damaged due to drone attacks? (Yes 60%, No 40%)
Monday, March 2, 2009
Operationalizing COIN strategy and definitions
In response to Janine Davidson's talk at the Combined Arms Center Senior Leadership Conference.We could use a definition of where the military hands off command to USAID, and where USAID hands off command to State. This way everybody has something to work towards, a general set of goals, starting with a focus on security, moving to governance and economic infrastructure development, and THEN working on making it 'perfect' (a transparent and open democratic state).
Obviously these things all need to be worked on simultaneously, the key is where the focus is. From this we can then derive a series of clear, concise, and achievable goals at each stage of operations. Such distinctions would have to be made on a region-by-region basis. After OIF I, for example, the Kurdish regions were ready to be handed off to State almost immediately. Handing off command doesn't mean you pack up an leave, it just means the mission has transitioned to a new focus. Unless someone decides to start arming the USAID workers, the military will still have to show up in a big way.
Sunday, March 1, 2009
Iraq and the Surge
A SOFA, not a love seat.
As most people in the foreign policy community expected, there wasn't much daylight between the President's plan and the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) already hammered out between the Bush Administration and the Iraqi government.I am still concerned by the rush by a great many smart people to jump on the bandwagon regarding expectations of Iraq's security situation over the next year and a half or so. Everyone is making the assumption that the situation will continue to improve or stay roughly the same. Certainly, this is the most likely scenario. But what if security rapidly deteriorates? Especially if it does so in a direct correlation with troop level reductions, the war started under the previous administrations will now be the current administration's to lose. There are all kinds of very possible, if improbable, scenarios regarding large scale ethnic cleansing, accommodation of radicalists who use Iraq as a base to strike at moderate regimes throughout the region, etc
I'm not saying the withdrawal timeline is a bad idea. I think in a war among the people, it is vital that the people are aware of the broad strokes of the strategy, if not the operational details. Iraqi public opinion and US public opinion are bound together with regards to withdrawal. As Thomas P.M. Barnett is fond of saying, victory in Iraq will have been achieved when they vote to kick us out. All I'm saying is, if there is one vital lesson about Iraq, its that hope is not a plan. We need a strategy in place if things go bad.
Sunday, February 8, 2009
Great Powers

In the meantime, check out the question and answer article (pdf!) with the author, Thomas P.M. Barnett, who is pretty much my favorite International Relations thinker and writer. The interview itself is by Zenpundit, an excellent thinker and writer in his own right.
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