On Armor

Something I realized the other day, even though its been staring me in the face for a long time. The requirements in regards to force protection and armor are much, much higher doing the SysAdmin work (to use Barnetts phrase to describe counterinsurgency, stability, and security operations) then they are for actual combat operations. It seems obvious when you look at it, but it can be hard to overcome the conventional wisdom that you need more armor for war, and less for stability ops.

In combat, mobility and stealth play an important role in force protection. But how do you maneuver against an enemy when your mission is to guard a police station, or a tribal elders meeting, or a construction project? You really don't, you are out there, exposed for all to see, no concealment, no mobility, so you all you can do is rely on cover. Armored vehicles, giant blast walls, stand off distance created by barriers. These are tools of the SysAdmin Force, not a force whose focus is on actual combat.

This same concept would apply for forces in Land, Sea, and Air. And it illustrates why tanks are still needed to control key points in a counterinsurgency campaign, when conventional wisdom would suggest their effectiveness to be poor at best. As the Navy moves into the Littorals, the requirement for Force Protection rises even higher than for it blue water ships. Why was body armor not a problm until the Occupation of Iraq started? Why were unarmored Hummvee's good enough for the initial invasion but inadequate for the follow on?

Specifically I'm thinking about the LCS, which is a SysAdmin boat in its mission if ever there was one, and its speed vs. mobility trade-off dramatically in favor of speed. Unless the LCS is going to be chasing down pirate skiffs single handedly, which seems unlikely, speed isn't the critical factor, force protection is. Destroyers and Cruisers need to be fast on the basis of their need for combat maneuverability, the LCS doesn't need to outrun a torpedo, its going to have to sit on station within visual range of shore while it supports RHIBs or logistical operations on shore and needs to be loaded up with force protection measures.

On the Army side, think about the FCS, which is billed as a means of replacing the Stryker Brigades. But the Strykers aren't what needs replacing, its the Abrams in the role of an armor asset for a rapidly deploying combat force. This may sound like crazy talk, but I say, keep the Abrams in reduced numbers for the SysAdmin, and push the FCS for the Leviathan. FCS offers greater mobility with less force protection, so its fundamentally a maneuver warfare asset.