North Korea and the Bifurcated Force . . .

I spend most of my time talking about the Stability and Support side of my "divided force" structure. But the Katana side is important too. In addition to nuclear weapons that maintain the status quo of the international system, a dedicated strike force is needed to take down bad actors at what Kenneth Waltz calls the nation-state level of analysis.

The initial invasion force in Iraq which destroyed the military capability of Iraq under Saddam Hussein consisted of the following main combat elements:



I MEF:

• 1st Marine Division (3 Heavy Brigades)
  
• 1st UK Division (1 Commando, 1 Air Assault, 1 Armoured Brigade)
  

V Corps:

• 3rd Infantry Division (3 Heavy Brigades)
  
• 101st Airborne Division (3 Air Assault Brigades)
• 2nd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division
  

Other:

• Various Special Operations Task Forces
• 173rd Airborne Brigade

Note that all of these forces consist of either Heavy or Airborne/Air Assault BCTs in modern parlance, such is the composition of the Katana force. All told there are 7 Heavy Brigades and 6 Airborne/Commando/Air Assault Brigades. This force was sufficient for the initial invasion and the complete destruction of Iraqi military capability. They were utterly inappropriate and insufficient for the following stability and support operations.

North Korea is the largest, most dangerous, and most likely target for military invasion in the world today. While the posession of nuclear weapons makes such an act very risky, the low number of weapons combined with their inability to be mounted on ballistic missiles at this time presents a narrow window in which regime change might occur. Additionally, at 1.2 million, the military force is approximately 3.2X what the regime of Saddam Hussein was able to field at the time. Improvements in support and logisitcs would allow us to get away with a force 3x the size used in Iraq. So based solely on the invasion force needed to take down the Hussein-era military, I project that you would need somewhere in the neighborhood of 21 Heavy Brigades and 18 Forced Entry Capable Brigades would be required.

• The US Army has 19 Heavy Brigade Combat Teams and 10 Forced Entry Capable Brigades.
• The British could offer, at a stretch, 2 more of each.
  
• And with the Marine RCTs able to switch between Forced Entry or Heavy roles depending on equipment provided, we would reach the requisite number.
  
• And thats before you even begin to count South Korea's 20 Division Force (more equivalent to large Heavy BCTs).

So it could be done. I'm not advocating it, and the casualties amongst all forces and civilian populations would be worse than we can imagine. Additionally, it would require us to completely abandon all other global commitments. And we can expect to spend at least a decade trying to integrate a devestated penninsula back into the global community without upsetting the delicate balance of power in East Asia.

There is another card on the table, however, and that is China. If North Korean behavior grows threatening enough to affect that hyper-capitalist power's bottom line, even they will want to see them go. And they certainly DO have the manpower. Their force probably would only be able to play a minimal role in an invasion, but in the stability and support operations afterwards, China and South Korea would have the presence and the legitimacy to make a stable penninsula happen. The US would still be left with the difficult task of playing referee and getting China to accept a reunified Korea. But in this age of globalization, the prospect of a Korea that can be friendly to both China and the US isn't hard to imagine.

Additionally, this would essentially be the last major regime change the US could forseeably undertake. With the important possible exception of Myanmar, another place where cooperation with China would be key. Those two scenarios are perhaps the only currently forseeable times where the US will ever again be engaged in ground-based maneuver warfare. Maintaining a regime change force after those operations would be important both as a deterrent against rogue regimes and a hedge against any unforseen state-on-state conflict, but the force could be much smaller, enabling us to focus additional resources on "preventive medicine" in the form of soft power and the usage of the Wakizashi.

Why you should be a Political Scientist . . .

Here is something more relevant to my own personal background as a Political Science major:



This is a fascinating look at decision making in Iran that underlines a fundamental shift that has occurred in the fields of Political Science and International Relations over the last several decades. Namely, the reduction of complex interactions between individuals into mathematical models that can be used in a wider range of situations and scenarios. This model, produced by one of the core personalities of the Political Science community, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, is compelling. Not only for its intracacy but also for what I believe to be a correct interpretation of the various actors and influences on Iranian politics and the likely future outcomes.

So study Math kids, its everywhere.

The Global Commons

I liked Gates quote about the global commons, something along the lines of America's military mission being to insure access for all to the Sea, the Air, Space, and Cyberspace. These are the vital areas through which international commerce must travel.

Our mission is not so much about denying access as it is about ensuring it. Keeping the sea lanes open for freighters, the air safe for airline traffic, space secured for commercial and military use, and cyberspace access protected for individuals and corporations alike. This is outlined in the National Defense Strategy and a key component is cooperative military engagement to provide security. I think we are seeing the beginnings of this off the coast of Somalia, and I believe it will one day extend to aerospace and cyberspace as well.

Pakistan on the Brink . . .

How would the US respond if an armed extremist organization only nominally supportive of certain parts of the government were inching closer to Washington D.C. and had just passed Fredricksburg, VA?

Probably not as lackadaisically as the Pakistani government seems to be acting. While they have taken the fight to the enemy in recent days, it was only after intense international and domestic pressure to do so. It's enough to make even the most ardent believer in democracy long for the days of Musharraf. You need a country to have a democracy. How can the government possibly be so relaxed about an armed challenger only 60 miles away from the capital?

First, the weak government in Pakistan offers little in the way of constraint or control over the nations military, unlike the previous regime. In a country where political power has been defined by the relationship between the military and the leader for so long, we now have Asif Ali Zadari. Enough said.

But foremost, the military is a potential challenger to the civilian government. Every inch of ground the Taliban gain weakens the civilian government, and helps to enable a greater role for the military and intelligence services in the political process. So by not fighting the Taliban, the military makes its own political position stronger. This is a dangerous game of chicken to play. If the Taliban gain too much, they might just trigger a fracturing of the country itself.

The Pakistani military is tipping its hand quite a bit if you know where to look:

• Requesting the handover of US military drones to their control.
• General Kayani has developed quite the working relationship with Adm Mullen, who in turn, has been talking him up before Congress.
  
• Getting the OSD to call for increased spending, not in police or other COIN-related fields, but in direct military aid.

The Pakistani military, having now waited long enough to clearly demonstrate the civilian government's ineptitude (despite their own complacency in the matter) is now striking back against the Taliban with its full force. A successful, continuous campaign has the potential to gain even more political capital which it can then use to further undermine the civilian government. Whether it is Gen Kayani himself, or the leader of ISI, or some broader consensus reached among the large military establishment, it is clear that the apparent ineptitude of the Pakistani military is not incompetence, but rather a careful game of brinksmanship with a dangerous foe.