The War Caste

The disconnect between military and civil society should be cause for great concern on both sides. The level of communication between the two has quite possibly never been lower, in spite of this Long War and unprecedented civilian access to information. Somehow, the military and their families and the general American public have divorced. The average American's military knowledge is more abysmal than their general political knowledge. The two sides look across the great chasm at each other with a mixture of curiosity and contempt.

To civilians, the military has been mystified, vilified, or enshrined in a sacred shroud of secrecy, often all of the above. It is too large, too complex, too secretive to be understood, and thus civilian responses range between hero-worship and paranoia. To the civilian mind, Special Operations Forces are running around the Federally Administered Tribal Areas in Pakistan by themselves like Jack Bauer, shooting, maiming, torturing whoever they want.

To the military, they and their families bare 100% of the costs of this conflict, which a majority of the schizophrenic American public supported before they decided not to support it. Civilians are at best held in mild contempt. At worst viewed as sheep to be herded and shown the error of their ways.

The military doesn't rule this country, we must be helpful servants, always subordinate to our civilian masters. And we must be advocates. Just as there are organizations of doctors who advocate nationalized health care, or organizations of scientists to advocate the concept of Global Warming, it is our job to respectfully bring discussions of grand strategy and corresponding force structure to the national civic debate. The only difference is that we do not have the option to disobey or defy our civilian leaders once they give an order.

If we in the military fail in this task, we can expect time and time again for civilians to jump on the bandwagon when we say we can complete a mission, and immediately jump off when the going gets tough. And up to this point, we have failed in this task. We must not lose the hearts and minds of the American people, for they, just as easily as the Iraqi or Afghan peoples, can veto our efforts to complete the mission they assigned us.

When you assume, you make an ass out of you and me . . .

I posted over at ComingAnarchy.com regarding basic assumptions being made in US policy options toward Tehran:

With the vast array of knowledge and experience I command as an undergraduate Political Science Major, I will attempt to answer these questions:

• Is Iran after the bomb?

a)I think they want to know that if they needed to make one, they could. They have the ballistic missile capability worked out (sort of), they’re going to get the enriched uranium (sort of). They’ll study bomb design, and maybe even machine the conventional parts of the weapon. I believe they’ll go for something like the Japan or Israeli approach to nuclear deterrence. Either getting them and not admitting it, or developing the capability but not assembling it until they see an unfriendly UNSC Resolution on the horizon.

• Would Iran strike first?

a)The perception that they would strike first seems to be built upon the idea that the Iranian government is too irrational to be deterred, in spite of any evidence that they have ever acted with anything less than careful planning and completely rational strategic planning. These guys invented chess, and have the luxury of strategic leadership in the government that don’t have to worry about getting kicked out of office. The mullahs are a political organization with a religious ideology, not a religious organization with a political ideology.

• Would Iran keep control of the bomb if they got it, or would it be at risk of slipping into hands of unreliable or irrational actors?

a) Iran knows who they deal with, and they want control of everything in their domain. Whether its the military, the Strait of Hormuz, or their own population. If they get the bomb they aren’t going to give it to someone they can’t control. They know that no matter how much plausible deniability they have, any nuclear attack in Southwest Asia is going to result in Tehran becoming the worlds largest parking lot. They aren’t going to give it to the IRGC, or the Hezzies, or Hamas, or their slightly inbred second cousin. Those things are all good to have around, but you can’t completely control them. I wouldn’t be surprised if they tried to maintain direct control over them within the Revolutionary Council.

The fundamental assertion driving all three questions is that Iran is somehow on some kind of irrational drive for nuclear power. Iran went for the bomb because we took down the country on either side of them, and control the Gulf below them, things are scary from their point of view. The assertion of the irrationality of their government is only justified if they are indeed a religious, apolitical organization which puts ideology over the most basic concern of any organization: survival. Yet this belief is commonly held despite an astounding lack of evidence to support it. We all fear what we don’t know, fear leads to anger, anger leads to hate, etc . . . Not a proper basis for a policy decision.

Talking to the Taliban?

Sure enough, Gates is talking about "reconciliation" with the Taliban. The situation is complicated by an indeterminable relationship with Al-Qa-ida and a fractured organizational structure. According to the Rand Corporation: 50% of insurgencies end with negotiations, 25% end with insurgent victory, and 19% end with a military defeat of the insurgency. Given that getting more resources for the Afghanistan effort is like pulling teeth, it is doubtful a military solution is possible. That leaves us with talking to the Taliban, who despite their rhetoric, are extremely concentrated in a specific ethnic group. Not just Pashtun, but Dari Pashtun. I think the possibility of a negotiated "Tribal Region" as exists in Pakistan, is the most probable outcome. In exchange for not actively seeking to topple the Kabul government, Karzai will let them be. The key for the US and NATO will be to seek an addendum to that agreement that makes it explicitly clear that harboring Al-Qa'ida is not ok. Going after them is going to get harder and rely more and more on covert means.

A Taliban Awakening?

Saudi brokered peace talks taking place between the Afghan government and the Taliban. The Taliban additionally openly renounce Al Qaeda. What I suspect is that a few clans in the Taliban are negotiating, and battle lines are being drawn amongst the tribes in the region, some moving towards government acceptance and fighting Al Qaeda, and some becoming more closely aligned with Al Qaeda.

The Department of Defense and the Department of Security and Foreign Development

The Active Duty Army will have 48 Brigade Combat Teams by 2013 arrayed as such:

• 19 Heavy Brigade Combat Teams (20 if you count 3rd ACR, which is close enough for our purposes)

• 6 Stryker Brigade Combat Teams

• 13 Infantry Brigade Combat Teams

• 6 Airborne Brigade Combat Teams

• 4 Air Assault Brigade Combat Teams
  

• Additionally, the Marines have 12 Regimental Combat Teams

• Grand Total 48+12= 60 Brigades
  

I see the HBCT's optimized for high-intensity conflict, the SBCT's optimized for mid-intensity conflict, and IBCT's becoming more and more optimized for mid-to-low intensity conflict. This is the way it should be. Marine RCTs can be structured to fight in high-intensity conflicts, but the do their best work at the mid-to-low level, their organic equipment typically being more comparable to a Stryker BCT. In the future, Stryker and Infantry BCT's will have to integrate peacekeeping and nation building capabilities at the unit level, this will entail the attachment of:

1. NGO's (UN, WHO)
2. Coalition allies (UK&Friends, EU, China, India, whoever wants to come along)
3. Public sector orgs (State Dept, USAID, Peace Corps)
4. Private sector - Blackwater, KBR, Halliburton, choke on it hippies, they're here to stay.
   
5. Foreign Direct Investment - It will start with Security and Infrastructure contracts directly with the coalition, but if security improves enough, the investment starts to flow and then a Less-Developed Country becomes a Low-Cost Country, ripe for rapid economic growth that is the pre-condition for any lasting peace.

These new elements will be controversial and will blur the lines between military and civilian, overseas and posse comitatus, but they are necessary, and given the current trajectory, inevitable. I would posit that a reduction in the number of Heavy Brigade Combat Teams is necessary both from a strategic and fiscal point of view. An increase in the now proven and accepted Stryker Brigades wouldn't be a bad thing. The reduction in HBCT's will reduce the cost of FCS, and the $ saved can be used for more Strykers.

I propose developing the entire combat forces of the United States along a delineation between Forced-Entry Capable, and Follow-on units. High-End assets go with the Forced-Entry critters, Cheap and plentiful follow behind them.

Proposed Force Structure:

Forced Entry Capable Teams (23+8) Brigades Total) -

1. Stays in DoD
   
2. 6 Airborne Brigade Combat Teams and 4 Air Assault Brigade Combat Teams by Air
3. 10 Heavy Brigade Combat Teams (+ 8 National Guard HBCTs) by Land
4. 3 Marine Expeditionary Brigades and their naval support assets by Sea
   
5. Carrier Strike Groups, SSNs, SSGNs, Surface combatants DDG or larger
   
6. F-22's F-35's, B-1's, B-2's, etc
7. Kicks in the door, grabs the bad guy, Mugabe, Kim Jong-Il, etc, and then pulls out, usually in less than a month.
   

Security and Development Force (37+19) Brigades Total) -

1. Moves to a Department of Foreign Security and Development that unites diplomatic, security, public, and private development and stabilization centers under one flag in a one effort.
   
2. 12 Stryker BCTs (+ 1 National Guard Stryker BCTs)
   
3. 16 Infantry BCTs (+ 18 National Guard Infantry BCTs)
   
4. 9 (The Remaining Marine RCT's)
5. LPD's and LSD's to support the humanitarian, peacekeeping, disaster-response, etc, Littoral Combat Ships
   
6. UAV's, UAV's, UAV's, Airlift, Airlift, Airlift
7. Follows immediately behind the Forced-Entry force, even sharing command and support structures with the DoD forces, is handed off command when security reaches a threshold (enemy can no longer operate beyond the company level) on a regional basis. Stays "until the job is done." If we get good at this, it doesn't have to be 5 years later, it can be a single year-long tour.
   

This delineation allows for a better management of conflicts without cutting any single branch completely out of the DoD budget. I believe they all have something to contribute, though obviously the majority of the effort will shift over time to supporting the Security and Development Force, which is simply an extension of the fact that we are running out of plausible nation-states that could challenge us and simply shifting focus to expanding economic connectivity. As Gates pointed out, where in the world would a plausible conventional conflict occur?

Two great posts regarding Future Force Composition:

First, Galrahn discusses the make up of the Navy.

Then Barnett has highlights of Gates speech at the National Defense University.