The 119th Agribusiness Development Team

The article speaks for itself:

BLOOMINGTON, Ind. (AP) - A 60-soldier Indiana National Guard unit is preparing for a mission to help farmers in Afghanistan boost production.

I hate to use the term, because its been done to death, but a big part of Stability Operations is the so-called, "Armed Social Work," that builds social, political, and economic bridges, not just among the local populace, but between the AOR and the road back home.

Meyers-Briggs is Unsubstantiated, unscientific, and statistically insignificant . . .

That being said . . . I ran the blog through this type analyzer and got this:

ISTP

The independent and problem-solving type. They are especially attuned to the demands of the moment are masters of responding to challenges that arise spontaneously. They generally prefer to think things out for themselves and often avoid inter-personal conflicts. 

The Mechanics enjoy working together with other independent and highly skilled people and often like seek fun and action both in their work and personal life. They enjoy adventure and risk such as in driving race cars or working as policemen and firefighters. 

Seems pretty accurate, but like I said over at Small Wars Journal, these things are written using terms so general, I might as well ask Miss Cleo to read my blog . . . 

Something I'm Working On.

I have been trying to figure out ways to improve the actual organization of things like the National Security Council.  This is a rough draft which incorporates the Regional Commands as implementers of Foreign Policy.  This particular chart tries to balance out regional implementation with an overarching advisory and coordination board.

I'm on a roll tonight.

Ok kiddies, lately I have seen more and more people suggesting that the US Military is taking over foreign policy.  And frankly, this is driving me nuts.

It seems to be historical revisionism at best to suggest that the military was ever not the key foreign policy tool of the United States.

1. Great White Fleet
2. The Barbary Coast
3. Gunboat Diplomacy in the Banana Republics
4.   . . . and in China too.   The Sand Pebbles (1966) anyone?
5. Civilize em' with a Krag

Those are just a few I could come up with off the top of my head.  But seriously, I have even heard someone who generally isn't a tinfoil-hatter suggest Gates is merely using COIN strategy to move the military into things like foreign development projects.  Gates isn't after more power, the dude has been trying to retire since the day he got the job.  He is doing his job and filling in the staggering mission gap between the State Department and Department of Defense that is right now being occupied by a ragtag group of:

• Military COIN strategists
• Academics in the social sciences
• Private Contractors
• NGOs
• USAID FSO's
• Some guys from Army Special Forces (the light side ones, not the dark side crowd). 

 Honestly, you probably wouldn't be able to fill a good-sized Hotel Conference Hall if you got them all together.  And yet this is the most important job in the 21st Century, these are the guys that are going to stand on the seem between war and peace and try to drag nation-states away from the brink.  So excuse the hell out of Gates for trying to make sure this job gets done.  Gates isn't talking about the militarization of foreign policy, he's talking about the diplomatization of what has historically been a military-led foreign policy.

Why isn't State doing this job?  Because State is all about working with existing Nation-states, and their institutional mindset is at the embassy in Paris, not Baghdad. I like this quote by Nagl and Fick over at ForeignPolicy.com: 

This imperative to get out among the people extends to U.S. civilians as well. U.S. Embassy staff are almost completely forbidden from moving around Kabul on their own. Diplomacy is, of course, about relationships, and rules that discourage relationships fundamentally limit the ability of American diplomats to do their jobs. The mission in Afghanistan is to stabilize the country, not to secure the embassy.

 The part that I made bold should be tattooed on some peoples foreheads.  And honestly, I like the idea of a separate organization for each part of the Defense, Development, and Diplomacy blend.  The so-called, "3D" Approach.  Department of Defense gets shrunk, State Department stays the same minus USAID, and a new Department of International Development built on the guys I listed above gets a hefty chunk of change.  Use the existing Unified Command regions, each Command has a Presidentially appointed Director, and a Deputy Director from DoD, DoS, and DID.  Good luck prying anything away from Secretary of State Clinton.

Oh well, a kid can dream can't he?

Join the Mobile Infantry!

Why no National Call to Service?  Why not empower the youth of this nation and motivate them to be part of something larger than themselves?  The President has not once, not ever, asked for people to join Americorps, Peace Corps, or the US Military, despite informing us rather consistently that we are indeed at war.  This has always bugged me, why not ask for volunteers?  Instead, the only thing he has ever asked of the American public is to shop.  Had the president asked for people to join the military when he addressed the nation that evening on September 11th, 2001, the recruiting offices would have been overwhelmed.  Instead we simply overwhelmed our creditors, and shopped away.

AFRICOM starts sneaking into Darfur . . .

http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=59831

The term, "quiet escalation" isnt generally applied to peacekeeping, but that seems to be what is happening here.  Its difficult for other countries to support the US in this endeavor because of national sovereignty issues that apply to so many of our partners and even allies.  But gradual escalation of peacekeeping, especially if we remain primarily a logistical partner, might be more palatable to the global community, which does want to see something positive happen, it just doesn't know what.  It is truly time for the US to return to the leadership role in these sorts of affairs.

On Armor

Something I realized the other day, even though its been staring me in the face for a long time. The requirements in regards to force protection and armor are much, much higher doing the SysAdmin work (to use Barnetts phrase to describe counterinsurgency, stability, and security operations) then they are for actual combat operations. It seems obvious when you look at it, but it can be hard to overcome the conventional wisdom that you need more armor for war, and less for stability ops.

In combat, mobility and stealth play an important role in force protection. But how do you maneuver against an enemy when your mission is to guard a police station, or a tribal elders meeting, or a construction project? You really don't, you are out there, exposed for all to see, no concealment, no mobility, so you all you can do is rely on cover. Armored vehicles, giant blast walls, stand off distance created by barriers. These are tools of the SysAdmin Force, not a force whose focus is on actual combat.

This same concept would apply for forces in Land, Sea, and Air. And it illustrates why tanks are still needed to control key points in a counterinsurgency campaign, when conventional wisdom would suggest their effectiveness to be poor at best. As the Navy moves into the Littorals, the requirement for Force Protection rises even higher than for it blue water ships. Why was body armor not a problm until the Occupation of Iraq started? Why were unarmored Hummvee's good enough for the initial invasion but inadequate for the follow on?

Specifically I'm thinking about the LCS, which is a SysAdmin boat in its mission if ever there was one, and its speed vs. mobility trade-off dramatically in favor of speed. Unless the LCS is going to be chasing down pirate skiffs single handedly, which seems unlikely, speed isn't the critical factor, force protection is. Destroyers and Cruisers need to be fast on the basis of their need for combat maneuverability, the LCS doesn't need to outrun a torpedo, its going to have to sit on station within visual range of shore while it supports RHIBs or logistical operations on shore and needs to be loaded up with force protection measures.

On the Army side, think about the FCS, which is billed as a means of replacing the Stryker Brigades. But the Strykers aren't what needs replacing, its the Abrams in the role of an armor asset for a rapidly deploying combat force. This may sound like crazy talk, but I say, keep the Abrams in reduced numbers for the SysAdmin, and push the FCS for the Leviathan. FCS offers greater mobility with less force protection, so its fundamentally a maneuver warfare asset.

New Foreign Policy Webpage

Absolutely marvelous, with some of the best journalists and regional experts out there on their blogging staff. Go see it now.

I especially enjoy Tom Ricks on Defense and Marc Lynch of 'Abu Aardvark' fame commenting on Southwest Asian Affairs.  I'm still pouring over it, but that place is a goldmine for sure.  And they all start off berating John Bolton's op-ed, and if there is a single way to get on my good side, its probably with berating one of Bolton's absurdly irrational and uninformed rants.  Either that or with food.