Zakaria, not to be confused with the Kurdish pop star

One of my favorite columnists, the intelligent, articulate, multicultural counterpoint to Lou Dobbsian xenophobia and isolationism, Fareed Zakaria at Newsweek, has a new column out asking the Obama administration to make the formation of a National Grand Strategy a top Foreign Policy objective. The "Diplomacy by CNN" approach, where by US policy objectives are picked from news headlines, is just too reactive, whereas a Grand Strategy can unite us, and give us a real objective to pursue and work towards with our allies.

In fact, the whole Newsweek for 8 DEC 08 is like a 21st Century Foreign Policy Primer, balanced well with some great commentators, most of whom I agree with, some whom I don't. Go get it. Now.

Who's Your City - Richard Florida's regional based analysis of Globalization

David Eaves, who created this awesome map of Firefox pledges mashed with the Pentagon's New Map by Barnett, has struck again.

Here is an awesome new map comparing the "Global Village" concept, which I crudely summarize as development and innovation led by the Mega-Cities of the world; and their presence in relation to Barnett's map. He also has a great summary of the three different levels of analysis offered in turn by Friedman, Barnett, and Florida.

The 3D approach? (Diplomacy, Defense, Development) The Villages cooperate to defend each other and build new ones in the "Gap." All of which allows them to make more money, effectively incentivizing growth and collective security.

In the Navy . . .

Amphibs are where it's at, I would support cutting the carrier force by about 4 in return for 6 ship increase in Major Amphibs (LHA/LHD), and the LPDs (pictured here) and LSDs to go along with them.

What the Amphibs are for the US is what the USS Enterprise (the spaceship, not the aircraft carrier) is for the Federation. They provide incredible capabilities for rapid intervention in conflicts and humanitarian crisis, and the most effective way to stop a conflict is to nip it in the bud. An Amphib has the engineering, medical, and just enough combat capability to deal with a brewing conflict before it goes high-intensity.

The joke goes, how many aircraft carriers do you need? Just one, but you need it every where, all the time, with better reliability, carriers operational availability is improving enough that we can certainly afford to reduce the number, especially if we add a few Apmhibs to compensate. Amphibs also have additional usage beyond military, just look at the USS Kearsarge deployment in South America, all medical-related.

This goes along with my wider idea that we should have two military forces, a small task force or Joint Strike Force that is sized to take down the military of the largest potential nation-state competitor (nuclear powers don't count, its just not worth it). This force would be mainly built on Naval and Air Force airpower, and have all the cool whiz-bang toys. Abrams go here, FCS go here, F22/F35, CVNs, Subs, etc.

The other, much larger force would be a Counterinsurgency-Stabilization force that responds to Humanitarian and Intrastate conflicts. It would be mainly designed to stop states from failing or rebuild failed ones (including post-US intervention). It would primarily be based on Army and Marine infantry/engineer/civil affairs forces, and it gets the not so sexy armored cars, language, and cultural training. Strykers go here, MRAPs go here, UAVs and COIN birds like Super Tucanos, Amphibs, LCS, etc.

The only way to protect these two capabilities is to split them apart, otherwise we'll constantly be swinging from one side to the other depending on whose in charge. We need a warrior ethos, and we need a nation-builder.

The New Foreign Policy Team

• National Security Adviser: James Jones
  
• Department of Defense: Bob Gates - yay!
  
• State Department: Hillary Clinton
• Department of Homeland Security: Janet Napolitano
• US ambassador to the UN: Susan Rice
  

Congratulations, all very respectable choices, and good luck, you guys have more on your shoulders than anyone can possibly imagine, but I'm sure by now you know that.

Validation!

SWJ Op-ed suggesting that in the struggle between the Constabulary-Advisory Force and the War-fighting force, we need both.

Feels good . . .

The War Caste

The disconnect between military and civil society should be cause for great concern on both sides. The level of communication between the two has quite possibly never been lower, in spite of this Long War and unprecedented civilian access to information. Somehow, the military and their families and the general American public have divorced. The average American's military knowledge is more abysmal than their general political knowledge. The two sides look across the great chasm at each other with a mixture of curiosity and contempt.

To civilians, the military has been mystified, vilified, or enshrined in a sacred shroud of secrecy, often all of the above. It is too large, too complex, too secretive to be understood, and thus civilian responses range between hero-worship and paranoia. To the civilian mind, Special Operations Forces are running around the Federally Administered Tribal Areas in Pakistan by themselves like Jack Bauer, shooting, maiming, torturing whoever they want.

To the military, they and their families bare 100% of the costs of this conflict, which a majority of the schizophrenic American public supported before they decided not to support it. Civilians are at best held in mild contempt. At worst viewed as sheep to be herded and shown the error of their ways.

The military doesn't rule this country, we must be helpful servants, always subordinate to our civilian masters. And we must be advocates. Just as there are organizations of doctors who advocate nationalized health care, or organizations of scientists to advocate the concept of Global Warming, it is our job to respectfully bring discussions of grand strategy and corresponding force structure to the national civic debate. The only difference is that we do not have the option to disobey or defy our civilian leaders once they give an order.

If we in the military fail in this task, we can expect time and time again for civilians to jump on the bandwagon when we say we can complete a mission, and immediately jump off when the going gets tough. And up to this point, we have failed in this task. We must not lose the hearts and minds of the American people, for they, just as easily as the Iraqi or Afghan peoples, can veto our efforts to complete the mission they assigned us.

When you assume, you make an ass out of you and me . . .

I posted over at ComingAnarchy.com regarding basic assumptions being made in US policy options toward Tehran:

With the vast array of knowledge and experience I command as an undergraduate Political Science Major, I will attempt to answer these questions:

• Is Iran after the bomb?

a)I think they want to know that if they needed to make one, they could. They have the ballistic missile capability worked out (sort of), they’re going to get the enriched uranium (sort of). They’ll study bomb design, and maybe even machine the conventional parts of the weapon. I believe they’ll go for something like the Japan or Israeli approach to nuclear deterrence. Either getting them and not admitting it, or developing the capability but not assembling it until they see an unfriendly UNSC Resolution on the horizon.

• Would Iran strike first?

a)The perception that they would strike first seems to be built upon the idea that the Iranian government is too irrational to be deterred, in spite of any evidence that they have ever acted with anything less than careful planning and completely rational strategic planning. These guys invented chess, and have the luxury of strategic leadership in the government that don’t have to worry about getting kicked out of office. The mullahs are a political organization with a religious ideology, not a religious organization with a political ideology.

• Would Iran keep control of the bomb if they got it, or would it be at risk of slipping into hands of unreliable or irrational actors?

a) Iran knows who they deal with, and they want control of everything in their domain. Whether its the military, the Strait of Hormuz, or their own population. If they get the bomb they aren’t going to give it to someone they can’t control. They know that no matter how much plausible deniability they have, any nuclear attack in Southwest Asia is going to result in Tehran becoming the worlds largest parking lot. They aren’t going to give it to the IRGC, or the Hezzies, or Hamas, or their slightly inbred second cousin. Those things are all good to have around, but you can’t completely control them. I wouldn’t be surprised if they tried to maintain direct control over them within the Revolutionary Council.

The fundamental assertion driving all three questions is that Iran is somehow on some kind of irrational drive for nuclear power. Iran went for the bomb because we took down the country on either side of them, and control the Gulf below them, things are scary from their point of view. The assertion of the irrationality of their government is only justified if they are indeed a religious, apolitical organization which puts ideology over the most basic concern of any organization: survival. Yet this belief is commonly held despite an astounding lack of evidence to support it. We all fear what we don’t know, fear leads to anger, anger leads to hate, etc . . . Not a proper basis for a policy decision.

Talking to the Taliban?

Sure enough, Gates is talking about "reconciliation" with the Taliban. The situation is complicated by an indeterminable relationship with Al-Qa-ida and a fractured organizational structure. According to the Rand Corporation: 50% of insurgencies end with negotiations, 25% end with insurgent victory, and 19% end with a military defeat of the insurgency. Given that getting more resources for the Afghanistan effort is like pulling teeth, it is doubtful a military solution is possible. That leaves us with talking to the Taliban, who despite their rhetoric, are extremely concentrated in a specific ethnic group. Not just Pashtun, but Dari Pashtun. I think the possibility of a negotiated "Tribal Region" as exists in Pakistan, is the most probable outcome. In exchange for not actively seeking to topple the Kabul government, Karzai will let them be. The key for the US and NATO will be to seek an addendum to that agreement that makes it explicitly clear that harboring Al-Qa'ida is not ok. Going after them is going to get harder and rely more and more on covert means.

A Taliban Awakening?

Saudi brokered peace talks taking place between the Afghan government and the Taliban. The Taliban additionally openly renounce Al Qaeda. What I suspect is that a few clans in the Taliban are negotiating, and battle lines are being drawn amongst the tribes in the region, some moving towards government acceptance and fighting Al Qaeda, and some becoming more closely aligned with Al Qaeda.

The Department of Defense and the Department of Security and Foreign Development

The Active Duty Army will have 48 Brigade Combat Teams by 2013 arrayed as such:

• 19 Heavy Brigade Combat Teams (20 if you count 3rd ACR, which is close enough for our purposes)

• 6 Stryker Brigade Combat Teams

• 13 Infantry Brigade Combat Teams

• 6 Airborne Brigade Combat Teams

• 4 Air Assault Brigade Combat Teams
  

• Additionally, the Marines have 12 Regimental Combat Teams

• Grand Total 48+12= 60 Brigades
  

I see the HBCT's optimized for high-intensity conflict, the SBCT's optimized for mid-intensity conflict, and IBCT's becoming more and more optimized for mid-to-low intensity conflict. This is the way it should be. Marine RCTs can be structured to fight in high-intensity conflicts, but the do their best work at the mid-to-low level, their organic equipment typically being more comparable to a Stryker BCT. In the future, Stryker and Infantry BCT's will have to integrate peacekeeping and nation building capabilities at the unit level, this will entail the attachment of:

1. NGO's (UN, WHO)
2. Coalition allies (UK&Friends, EU, China, India, whoever wants to come along)
3. Public sector orgs (State Dept, USAID, Peace Corps)
4. Private sector - Blackwater, KBR, Halliburton, choke on it hippies, they're here to stay.
   
5. Foreign Direct Investment - It will start with Security and Infrastructure contracts directly with the coalition, but if security improves enough, the investment starts to flow and then a Less-Developed Country becomes a Low-Cost Country, ripe for rapid economic growth that is the pre-condition for any lasting peace.

These new elements will be controversial and will blur the lines between military and civilian, overseas and posse comitatus, but they are necessary, and given the current trajectory, inevitable. I would posit that a reduction in the number of Heavy Brigade Combat Teams is necessary both from a strategic and fiscal point of view. An increase in the now proven and accepted Stryker Brigades wouldn't be a bad thing. The reduction in HBCT's will reduce the cost of FCS, and the $ saved can be used for more Strykers.

I propose developing the entire combat forces of the United States along a delineation between Forced-Entry Capable, and Follow-on units. High-End assets go with the Forced-Entry critters, Cheap and plentiful follow behind them.

Proposed Force Structure:

Forced Entry Capable Teams (23+8) Brigades Total) -

1. Stays in DoD
   
2. 6 Airborne Brigade Combat Teams and 4 Air Assault Brigade Combat Teams by Air
3. 10 Heavy Brigade Combat Teams (+ 8 National Guard HBCTs) by Land
4. 3 Marine Expeditionary Brigades and their naval support assets by Sea
   
5. Carrier Strike Groups, SSNs, SSGNs, Surface combatants DDG or larger
   
6. F-22's F-35's, B-1's, B-2's, etc
7. Kicks in the door, grabs the bad guy, Mugabe, Kim Jong-Il, etc, and then pulls out, usually in less than a month.
   

Security and Development Force (37+19) Brigades Total) -

1. Moves to a Department of Foreign Security and Development that unites diplomatic, security, public, and private development and stabilization centers under one flag in a one effort.
   
2. 12 Stryker BCTs (+ 1 National Guard Stryker BCTs)
   
3. 16 Infantry BCTs (+ 18 National Guard Infantry BCTs)
   
4. 9 (The Remaining Marine RCT's)
5. LPD's and LSD's to support the humanitarian, peacekeeping, disaster-response, etc, Littoral Combat Ships
   
6. UAV's, UAV's, UAV's, Airlift, Airlift, Airlift
7. Follows immediately behind the Forced-Entry force, even sharing command and support structures with the DoD forces, is handed off command when security reaches a threshold (enemy can no longer operate beyond the company level) on a regional basis. Stays "until the job is done." If we get good at this, it doesn't have to be 5 years later, it can be a single year-long tour.
   

This delineation allows for a better management of conflicts without cutting any single branch completely out of the DoD budget. I believe they all have something to contribute, though obviously the majority of the effort will shift over time to supporting the Security and Development Force, which is simply an extension of the fact that we are running out of plausible nation-states that could challenge us and simply shifting focus to expanding economic connectivity. As Gates pointed out, where in the world would a plausible conventional conflict occur?

Two great posts regarding Future Force Composition:

First, Galrahn discusses the make up of the Navy.

Then Barnett has highlights of Gates speech at the National Defense University.

Pakistan

The conflict in Afghanistan will be decided by how we handle Pakistan. They simultaneously kill hundreds of Taliban, and shoot at us during cross-border raids. The ISI has Taliban leanings, the military has military leanings, and the civilian government has corrupt leanings.

While many have been in denial, Afghanistan was always a regional conflict, the failure of ISAF to see it as such has only resulted in a successful ouster of the Taliban in 2001 culminating with their dramatic resurgence.

Jammous!

With security rapidly improving in Iraq, we see many hard-charging combat units transitioning into things like helping locals care for livestock. How can we get better at this? Integrate NGO's at the BCT level once security improves to a defined level? Something to ponder...

Does this mean freighters can mount .50 cals now?

Galrahn over at Information Dissemination is talking about a US Navy statement saying that it can't/won't protect all civilian commerce transiting the Gulf of Aden. Which begs the question, who will? The cost to the global economy is substantial, as it is one of the most heavily trafficked straights in the world, and yet the Navy seems to feel that fighting piracy is below them. What in ze hell? The Navy seems to be in full retreat from the littoral region, even though that is the Naval equivalent of counterinsurgency warfare. Previously, they told the Marines they weren't getting any closer than 25nm to shore. So who is going to bare the cost/risk? With insurance costs on shipping skyrocketing I can't imagine it will be long before we see the rise of a "Blackwater Navy." Congressional hearings and civilian NGO outrage will be soon to follow no doubt. But that is the price you pay, if there is a demand going unfulfilled, it won't be long before the market creates a supply. Maybe I should strap on my eye patch and try to get a Letter of Marque from Congress?

Standing up . . .

The Iraqi military, border, and police forces are starting to approach self-sufficiency in the most important area, logistics! Between this and the provincial election law finally getting passed, the way is being paved to shift fire from Iraq back to the, "West Virginia of the Islamic World." (With apologies to the Islamic World.)

Things to come . . .

Starting this coming Monday, I'll begin discussing future rolls of each military branch. I'm going to try and throw a lot out there just to get the ball rolling. I know more about things Army, Marine, and SOF related, less so when it comes to the Navy and Air Force. Again, the key is to define the role within the context of a national grand strategy which focuses both on deterring or initiating a regime change in rogue actors, and providing stability and humanitarian aid everywhere else. While we are currently seeing the majority of the Stability Force growing within the Army and Marines, each branch has something it can contribute.

On Georgia

One quick note on the recent conflict in Georgia, while many people see this as the collapse of the Core-Gap theory of expanding Globalization, I think it is telling that despite the fact that Georgia is a clear ally of the United States, at no point did we ever offer military support against Russia. Regardless of who you see as the provocateur in that conflict, and I will be quick to point out that Georgian democracy is at best, wanting, the fact is that the Cold War military dynamic with Russia hasn't changed. They still have nukes. If we do have a conflict with Russia, it will once again be by proxy. And the constabulary force is better suited to such a conflict. The only nations we can reasonably expect to go to war with on their own territory, (whether perceived or actual) are those without nuclear weapons. Hence why I include the non-nuclear caveat in my force sizing argument. The only way to persuade a nuclear enabled state at an acceptable cost is to use diplomacy to bring them into the international system, economics to undermine the base of their power. Remember Putin's soul? It looked a lot better before oil went above $100 a barrel.

Inaugural Post

BLUF:

In the study of modern warfare, a bifurcation has arisen between those who believe we must structure and deploy our military to combat primarily non-state actors, primarily in the form of counterinsurgencies, and those who believe we should align our forces to face traditional state opponents. I believe that this is a false dichotomy, and that as the only military power with a truly global reach, it is our responsibility to provide both options to policy makers.

First, how this all got started, LTG Caldwell says it much better than I could.

GEN Omar Bradley once stated that "Amateurs talk tactics, professionals study logistics." The weakest link in the logistical base of the US military, or the military of any truly democratic state, will always be the political will of its citizenry. For this reason, it is vital that we include civilians in any discussion about the future structure and purpose of our Armed Forces. I offer this blog as an open forum for the discussion of anything from the tactical (counterinsurgency, maneuver warfare, special operations) to the operational ("The Long War," AFRICOM) to the strategic (procurement, force structure, forward deployment).

In this discussion I find several publications to be of particular utility:

- Thomas P.M. Barnett: The Pentagon's New Map, Blueprint for Action, and the soon to be published: Great Powers.

- Thomas L. Friedman: The Lexus and the Olive Tree, The World is Flat

- Combined Arms Center: FM 3-0: Operations, The Counterinsurgency Field Manual, FM 3-24 and Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5

-and many more, but these form the basis of my personal understanding of global conflict and the prescription for its cure . . . I welcome additional submissions for my perusing pleasure.

Additionally, there is a great spectrum of my fellow Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, and Airmen, whom I turn to as sources of information, insight, and experience. And there are of course other sources such as blogs, traditional media outlets, and my own twisted imagination.

For those not squared away on current military affairs, there are essentially two schools of thought on the direction of future conflict. They are generally, but by no means entirely, divided along generational lines, with an older, Cold War-era group seeing a world where the great powers of the planet must inevitably clash in tradtional military struggles, and a younger, mostly junior and senior officer crowd that sees the future of the military lying in stability operations, conterinsurgency, and humanitarian aid, all with the purpose of reducing regional conflicts that could scale up into larger full-fledged wars. These distinctions rule over how they see aquisitions, research, force structure, pretty much everything that comprises the military. If you believe in the Stability Operations crowd, you want Amphibious Warfare ships, UAVs, and tons of boots on the ground to do everything from handing out aid to tracking down terrorists. If you are a Westphalian Warrior, you want Tanks, Subs, F-22s, all complemented with a healthy serving of Nukes on the side.

I believe that we must have a force for both types of warfare. One that can eliminate state actors by force, and one that can work with NGOs, coalition partners, and local leaders to target violent non-state actors, build up local security infrastructure, and pave the way for economic development that eventually improves quality of life. I believe that we need a small, conventional force that is "sized" to take down the armed forces of the most militarily powerful non-nuclear enabled "rogue" state. (currently Iran) And a larger constabulary force that can act to spread security in any part of the world destabilized by disaster, be it natural or man-made.

This blog is a discussion about how to best achieve those two forces, as they are what is expected of us as a military force by both the world and the American taxpayer. I offer this basic outline only as a starting point, and welcome discussion, including that which suggests we go completely one way or the other. Who knows, maybe you'll change my mind.