Pakistan on the Brink . . .

How would the US respond if an armed extremist organization only nominally supportive of certain parts of the government were inching closer to Washington D.C. and had just passed Fredricksburg, VA?

Probably not as lackadaisically as the Pakistani government seems to be acting. While they have taken the fight to the enemy in recent days, it was only after intense international and domestic pressure to do so. It's enough to make even the most ardent believer in democracy long for the days of Musharraf. You need a country to have a democracy. How can the government possibly be so relaxed about an armed challenger only 60 miles away from the capital?

First, the weak government in Pakistan offers little in the way of constraint or control over the nations military, unlike the previous regime. In a country where political power has been defined by the relationship between the military and the leader for so long, we now have Asif Ali Zadari. Enough said.

But foremost, the military is a potential challenger to the civilian government. Every inch of ground the Taliban gain weakens the civilian government, and helps to enable a greater role for the military and intelligence services in the political process. So by not fighting the Taliban, the military makes its own political position stronger. This is a dangerous game of chicken to play. If the Taliban gain too much, they might just trigger a fracturing of the country itself.

The Pakistani military is tipping its hand quite a bit if you know where to look:

• Requesting the handover of US military drones to their control.
• General Kayani has developed quite the working relationship with Adm Mullen, who in turn, has been talking him up before Congress.
  
• Getting the OSD to call for increased spending, not in police or other COIN-related fields, but in direct military aid.

The Pakistani military, having now waited long enough to clearly demonstrate the civilian government's ineptitude (despite their own complacency in the matter) is now striking back against the Taliban with its full force. A successful, continuous campaign has the potential to gain even more political capital which it can then use to further undermine the civilian government. Whether it is Gen Kayani himself, or the leader of ISI, or some broader consensus reached among the large military establishment, it is clear that the apparent ineptitude of the Pakistani military is not incompetence, but rather a careful game of brinksmanship with a dangerous foe.

Branches? We don't need no stinkin' branches!

I prefer a Waltzian disaggregation of the Armed Forces over this archaic "branch" notion.

System Level - Strategic deterrence to maintain the global political and economic system. Nuclear weapons, high technology research done by DARPA, and the gradual prototype development of major weapons platforms like the DDG-1000.

State Level - Maintain an intervention force that deploys on a surge basis against a rogue state or regime. This force must be able to rapidly mobilize and deploy against states that violate the basic rules of international governance. Like committing genocide or developing WMDs. Airborne BCTs, CVNs/LHDs/LHAs, major surface combatants, Marine RCTs, etc.

Individual Level - The counter-insurgency, training, and advisory force. The force that rolls in after the Marines but before State Dept. They come in with international parters, OGAs, NGOs, etc. Primarily people based. Advising teams, infantry, civil affairs, psy ops, etc.

Special Operations - They perform tasks in all three areas but they really specialize in managing the transistions between these levels. Some, like SEALs and Rangers, mainly work between the system and state level. Others, like Special Forces, are specialized for somewhere between the State and individual level. The super secret squirrels in 1st SFOD or ST 6, work between the individual level and maintaining the overall global status quo.

There is probably room for another level of analysis for groups, especially in the context of ethnically-driven conflict. Kurds, Iraqi Sunnis, Pashtun, etc. Something else to think about it . . .

In the Korengal Valley . . .

I try to avoid chest thumping when US military forces engage the enemy and are victorious. I refrained from commenting on the successful end of the hostage situation off the coast of Somalia because I recognize the dangerous escalation it represents. While I am glad for the safe return of the Captain, what was a money-driven criminal activity now includes a revenge-driven ideological conflict with (who else?) the United States.

Death should neither inspire glee, nor paralyze with fear, but instead should draw a healthy respect from those of us to whom it is a constant companion. As such, every decision we make carries with it a certain finality, every choice carries the weight of the world. In the Korengal Valley, a 2nd Lieutenant named Smith made an excellent choice selecting an ambush site that resulted in definitive victory against insurgents in that area.

New York Times

About 50 yards separated the two sides, but Lieutenant Smith did not want to start shooting too soon, he said, “because if too many lived then we’d be up there fighting them all night.”

Hopefully this action will enable more population-centric strategies to succeed. Such strategies, tedious and fragile as they are, represent the only means of creating enough stability to build the governance and economic infrastructure to allow us to someday leave without eventually returning. Now the Army must capitalize on the information operations (IO) potential of this fight to create a narrative that the Insurgents can offer only endless war against an ever-shrinking global community, where as the Coalition can offer economic development and opportunity, and better institutions of governance. Of course, we have to live up to our ideals as well.

Nevertheless, the Soldiers of 1st ID in the Korengal Valley have given us the opportunity not to fail them. And for that, they have my appreciation as great Soldiers and fellow brothers-in-arms.

On safe havens . . .

Going after every regional safe haven presents many challenges, and some would say it is better that we retreat within our borders and build a, "Fortress America," as a means of self defense. I present the following, originally posted as a comment on Abu Muqawama:

Fortress America has the advantage of being the cheapest course of action, but that is about it.

It doesn't take a lot to stir the pot and foster resentment against the US. Like it or not, wherever someone sees economic expansion eroding human welfare, we will be seen as the culprit. We are the face of Globalization, and will continue to be so for the next several decades at least.

Certainly our involvement in Southwest Asia was minuscule in September of 2001 in comparison to what it is today. But that was not enough to protect us. We can't have American security without global security, whether it be military, economic, or social in nature.

Firewalling ourselves off from the world can't protect our businesses that rely on international trade and finance to function, it will leave a tremendous security gap in many regions that rely on the US military presence for regional stability. If we pull out of the southwest Pacific, regional players like Japan and China will step up and quite possibly trigger an arms race. If we pull out of Southwest Asia, the same will occur with Saudi Arabia and Iran. It won't take long for these problems to reach us back on our continent.

The real key is to work with regional partners to create a cooperative global security establishment. Build up the AU and let them address Somalia. Work with the PLAN to patrol the Malacca Straits, Create partnerships with Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan to address the poppy trade.

We won't go after every terrorist haven, but we will train, equip, and support the regional leaders that do. We set the agenda and give the locals a push in the right direction, and let them do it their way. I think that is the real essence of a, "New American Security."

The new Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy . . .

Andrew Exum has an article at The New Republic that makes a lot of sense as usual. He's the namesake blogger on Abu Muqawama (link on the left side of this blog).

The strategy is pretty vague so far, those of us who have read the white paper on the strategy are concerned by the overwhelming lack of any detail on pretty much anything other than troop numbers, which of course, can help, but can't win the war.

Exum correctly asserts that the key lies in improving governance in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, and doing so takes more civilian that military boots on the ground. This is a mission for USAID to take the lead in, while most of the military provides them security and trains the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police, SOF hunts for the really bad guys, and State coordinates the regional players, EU, Iran, Russia, India, and sure enough, China (the number one investor in Afghanistan).

Operationalizing COIN strategy and definitions

In response to Janine Davidson's talk at the Combined Arms Center Senior Leadership Conference.

We could use a definition of where the military hands off command to USAID, and where USAID hands off command to State. This way everybody has something to work towards, a general set of goals, starting with a focus on security, moving to governance and economic infrastructure development, and THEN working on making it 'perfect' (a transparent and open democratic state).

Obviously these things all need to be worked on simultaneously, the key is where the focus is. From this we can then derive a series of clear, concise, and achievable goals at each stage of operations. Such distinctions would have to be made on a region-by-region basis. After OIF I, for example, the Kurdish regions were ready to be handed off to State almost immediately. Handing off command doesn't mean you pack up an leave, it just means the mission has transitioned to a new focus. Unless someone decides to start arming the USAID workers, the military will still have to show up in a big way.

Inaugural Post

BLUF:

In the study of modern warfare, a bifurcation has arisen between those who believe we must structure and deploy our military to combat primarily non-state actors, primarily in the form of counterinsurgencies, and those who believe we should align our forces to face traditional state opponents. I believe that this is a false dichotomy, and that as the only military power with a truly global reach, it is our responsibility to provide both options to policy makers.

First, how this all got started, LTG Caldwell says it much better than I could.

GEN Omar Bradley once stated that "Amateurs talk tactics, professionals study logistics." The weakest link in the logistical base of the US military, or the military of any truly democratic state, will always be the political will of its citizenry. For this reason, it is vital that we include civilians in any discussion about the future structure and purpose of our Armed Forces. I offer this blog as an open forum for the discussion of anything from the tactical (counterinsurgency, maneuver warfare, special operations) to the operational ("The Long War," AFRICOM) to the strategic (procurement, force structure, forward deployment).

In this discussion I find several publications to be of particular utility:

- Thomas P.M. Barnett: The Pentagon's New Map, Blueprint for Action, and the soon to be published: Great Powers.

- Thomas L. Friedman: The Lexus and the Olive Tree, The World is Flat

- Combined Arms Center: FM 3-0: Operations, The Counterinsurgency Field Manual, FM 3-24 and Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5

-and many more, but these form the basis of my personal understanding of global conflict and the prescription for its cure . . . I welcome additional submissions for my perusing pleasure.

Additionally, there is a great spectrum of my fellow Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, and Airmen, whom I turn to as sources of information, insight, and experience. And there are of course other sources such as blogs, traditional media outlets, and my own twisted imagination.

For those not squared away on current military affairs, there are essentially two schools of thought on the direction of future conflict. They are generally, but by no means entirely, divided along generational lines, with an older, Cold War-era group seeing a world where the great powers of the planet must inevitably clash in tradtional military struggles, and a younger, mostly junior and senior officer crowd that sees the future of the military lying in stability operations, conterinsurgency, and humanitarian aid, all with the purpose of reducing regional conflicts that could scale up into larger full-fledged wars. These distinctions rule over how they see aquisitions, research, force structure, pretty much everything that comprises the military. If you believe in the Stability Operations crowd, you want Amphibious Warfare ships, UAVs, and tons of boots on the ground to do everything from handing out aid to tracking down terrorists. If you are a Westphalian Warrior, you want Tanks, Subs, F-22s, all complemented with a healthy serving of Nukes on the side.

I believe that we must have a force for both types of warfare. One that can eliminate state actors by force, and one that can work with NGOs, coalition partners, and local leaders to target violent non-state actors, build up local security infrastructure, and pave the way for economic development that eventually improves quality of life. I believe that we need a small, conventional force that is "sized" to take down the armed forces of the most militarily powerful non-nuclear enabled "rogue" state. (currently Iran) And a larger constabulary force that can act to spread security in any part of the world destabilized by disaster, be it natural or man-made.

This blog is a discussion about how to best achieve those two forces, as they are what is expected of us as a military force by both the world and the American taxpayer. I offer this basic outline only as a starting point, and welcome discussion, including that which suggests we go completely one way or the other. Who knows, maybe you'll change my mind.