In the Korengal Valley . . .

I try to avoid chest thumping when US military forces engage the enemy and are victorious. I refrained from commenting on the successful end of the hostage situation off the coast of Somalia because I recognize the dangerous escalation it represents. While I am glad for the safe return of the Captain, what was a money-driven criminal activity now includes a revenge-driven ideological conflict with (who else?) the United States.

Death should neither inspire glee, nor paralyze with fear, but instead should draw a healthy respect from those of us to whom it is a constant companion. As such, every decision we make carries with it a certain finality, every choice carries the weight of the world. In the Korengal Valley, a 2nd Lieutenant named Smith made an excellent choice selecting an ambush site that resulted in definitive victory against insurgents in that area.

New York Times

About 50 yards separated the two sides, but Lieutenant Smith did not want to start shooting too soon, he said, “because if too many lived then we’d be up there fighting them all night.”

Hopefully this action will enable more population-centric strategies to succeed. Such strategies, tedious and fragile as they are, represent the only means of creating enough stability to build the governance and economic infrastructure to allow us to someday leave without eventually returning. Now the Army must capitalize on the information operations (IO) potential of this fight to create a narrative that the Insurgents can offer only endless war against an ever-shrinking global community, where as the Coalition can offer economic development and opportunity, and better institutions of governance. Of course, we have to live up to our ideals as well.

Nevertheless, the Soldiers of 1st ID in the Korengal Valley have given us the opportunity not to fail them. And for that, they have my appreciation as great Soldiers and fellow brothers-in-arms.

Talking to the Taliban?

Sure enough, Gates is talking about "reconciliation" with the Taliban. The situation is complicated by an indeterminable relationship with Al-Qa-ida and a fractured organizational structure. According to the Rand Corporation: 50% of insurgencies end with negotiations, 25% end with insurgent victory, and 19% end with a military defeat of the insurgency. Given that getting more resources for the Afghanistan effort is like pulling teeth, it is doubtful a military solution is possible. That leaves us with talking to the Taliban, who despite their rhetoric, are extremely concentrated in a specific ethnic group. Not just Pashtun, but Dari Pashtun. I think the possibility of a negotiated "Tribal Region" as exists in Pakistan, is the most probable outcome. In exchange for not actively seeking to topple the Kabul government, Karzai will let them be. The key for the US and NATO will be to seek an addendum to that agreement that makes it explicitly clear that harboring Al-Qa'ida is not ok. Going after them is going to get harder and rely more and more on covert means.