In the Korengal Valley . . .

I try to avoid chest thumping when US military forces engage the enemy and are victorious. I refrained from commenting on the successful end of the hostage situation off the coast of Somalia because I recognize the dangerous escalation it represents. While I am glad for the safe return of the Captain, what was a money-driven criminal activity now includes a revenge-driven ideological conflict with (who else?) the United States.

Death should neither inspire glee, nor paralyze with fear, but instead should draw a healthy respect from those of us to whom it is a constant companion. As such, every decision we make carries with it a certain finality, every choice carries the weight of the world. In the Korengal Valley, a 2nd Lieutenant named Smith made an excellent choice selecting an ambush site that resulted in definitive victory against insurgents in that area.

New York Times

About 50 yards separated the two sides, but Lieutenant Smith did not want to start shooting too soon, he said, “because if too many lived then we’d be up there fighting them all night.”

Hopefully this action will enable more population-centric strategies to succeed. Such strategies, tedious and fragile as they are, represent the only means of creating enough stability to build the governance and economic infrastructure to allow us to someday leave without eventually returning. Now the Army must capitalize on the information operations (IO) potential of this fight to create a narrative that the Insurgents can offer only endless war against an ever-shrinking global community, where as the Coalition can offer economic development and opportunity, and better institutions of governance. Of course, we have to live up to our ideals as well.

Nevertheless, the Soldiers of 1st ID in the Korengal Valley have given us the opportunity not to fail them. And for that, they have my appreciation as great Soldiers and fellow brothers-in-arms.

The new Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy . . .

Andrew Exum has an article at The New Republic that makes a lot of sense as usual. He's the namesake blogger on Abu Muqawama (link on the left side of this blog).

The strategy is pretty vague so far, those of us who have read the white paper on the strategy are concerned by the overwhelming lack of any detail on pretty much anything other than troop numbers, which of course, can help, but can't win the war.

Exum correctly asserts that the key lies in improving governance in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, and doing so takes more civilian that military boots on the ground. This is a mission for USAID to take the lead in, while most of the military provides them security and trains the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police, SOF hunts for the really bad guys, and State coordinates the regional players, EU, Iran, Russia, India, and sure enough, China (the number one investor in Afghanistan).

The 119th Agribusiness Development Team

The article speaks for itself:

BLOOMINGTON, Ind. (AP) - A 60-soldier Indiana National Guard unit is preparing for a mission to help farmers in Afghanistan boost production.

I hate to use the term, because its been done to death, but a big part of Stability Operations is the so-called, "Armed Social Work," that builds social, political, and economic bridges, not just among the local populace, but between the AOR and the road back home.

The Department of Defense and the Department of Security and Foreign Development

The Active Duty Army will have 48 Brigade Combat Teams by 2013 arrayed as such:

• 19 Heavy Brigade Combat Teams (20 if you count 3rd ACR, which is close enough for our purposes)

• 6 Stryker Brigade Combat Teams

• 13 Infantry Brigade Combat Teams

• 6 Airborne Brigade Combat Teams

• 4 Air Assault Brigade Combat Teams
  

• Additionally, the Marines have 12 Regimental Combat Teams

• Grand Total 48+12= 60 Brigades
  

I see the HBCT's optimized for high-intensity conflict, the SBCT's optimized for mid-intensity conflict, and IBCT's becoming more and more optimized for mid-to-low intensity conflict. This is the way it should be. Marine RCTs can be structured to fight in high-intensity conflicts, but the do their best work at the mid-to-low level, their organic equipment typically being more comparable to a Stryker BCT. In the future, Stryker and Infantry BCT's will have to integrate peacekeeping and nation building capabilities at the unit level, this will entail the attachment of:

1. NGO's (UN, WHO)
2. Coalition allies (UK&Friends, EU, China, India, whoever wants to come along)
3. Public sector orgs (State Dept, USAID, Peace Corps)
4. Private sector - Blackwater, KBR, Halliburton, choke on it hippies, they're here to stay.
   
5. Foreign Direct Investment - It will start with Security and Infrastructure contracts directly with the coalition, but if security improves enough, the investment starts to flow and then a Less-Developed Country becomes a Low-Cost Country, ripe for rapid economic growth that is the pre-condition for any lasting peace.

These new elements will be controversial and will blur the lines between military and civilian, overseas and posse comitatus, but they are necessary, and given the current trajectory, inevitable. I would posit that a reduction in the number of Heavy Brigade Combat Teams is necessary both from a strategic and fiscal point of view. An increase in the now proven and accepted Stryker Brigades wouldn't be a bad thing. The reduction in HBCT's will reduce the cost of FCS, and the $ saved can be used for more Strykers.

I propose developing the entire combat forces of the United States along a delineation between Forced-Entry Capable, and Follow-on units. High-End assets go with the Forced-Entry critters, Cheap and plentiful follow behind them.

Proposed Force Structure:

Forced Entry Capable Teams (23+8) Brigades Total) -

1. Stays in DoD
   
2. 6 Airborne Brigade Combat Teams and 4 Air Assault Brigade Combat Teams by Air
3. 10 Heavy Brigade Combat Teams (+ 8 National Guard HBCTs) by Land
4. 3 Marine Expeditionary Brigades and their naval support assets by Sea
   
5. Carrier Strike Groups, SSNs, SSGNs, Surface combatants DDG or larger
   
6. F-22's F-35's, B-1's, B-2's, etc
7. Kicks in the door, grabs the bad guy, Mugabe, Kim Jong-Il, etc, and then pulls out, usually in less than a month.
   

Security and Development Force (37+19) Brigades Total) -

1. Moves to a Department of Foreign Security and Development that unites diplomatic, security, public, and private development and stabilization centers under one flag in a one effort.
   
2. 12 Stryker BCTs (+ 1 National Guard Stryker BCTs)
   
3. 16 Infantry BCTs (+ 18 National Guard Infantry BCTs)
   
4. 9 (The Remaining Marine RCT's)
5. LPD's and LSD's to support the humanitarian, peacekeeping, disaster-response, etc, Littoral Combat Ships
   
6. UAV's, UAV's, UAV's, Airlift, Airlift, Airlift
7. Follows immediately behind the Forced-Entry force, even sharing command and support structures with the DoD forces, is handed off command when security reaches a threshold (enemy can no longer operate beyond the company level) on a regional basis. Stays "until the job is done." If we get good at this, it doesn't have to be 5 years later, it can be a single year-long tour.
   

This delineation allows for a better management of conflicts without cutting any single branch completely out of the DoD budget. I believe they all have something to contribute, though obviously the majority of the effort will shift over time to supporting the Security and Development Force, which is simply an extension of the fact that we are running out of plausible nation-states that could challenge us and simply shifting focus to expanding economic connectivity. As Gates pointed out, where in the world would a plausible conventional conflict occur?

Jammous!

With security rapidly improving in Iraq, we see many hard-charging combat units transitioning into things like helping locals care for livestock. How can we get better at this? Integrate NGO's at the BCT level once security improves to a defined level? Something to ponder...

Inaugural Post

BLUF:

In the study of modern warfare, a bifurcation has arisen between those who believe we must structure and deploy our military to combat primarily non-state actors, primarily in the form of counterinsurgencies, and those who believe we should align our forces to face traditional state opponents. I believe that this is a false dichotomy, and that as the only military power with a truly global reach, it is our responsibility to provide both options to policy makers.

First, how this all got started, LTG Caldwell says it much better than I could.

GEN Omar Bradley once stated that "Amateurs talk tactics, professionals study logistics." The weakest link in the logistical base of the US military, or the military of any truly democratic state, will always be the political will of its citizenry. For this reason, it is vital that we include civilians in any discussion about the future structure and purpose of our Armed Forces. I offer this blog as an open forum for the discussion of anything from the tactical (counterinsurgency, maneuver warfare, special operations) to the operational ("The Long War," AFRICOM) to the strategic (procurement, force structure, forward deployment).

In this discussion I find several publications to be of particular utility:

- Thomas P.M. Barnett: The Pentagon's New Map, Blueprint for Action, and the soon to be published: Great Powers.

- Thomas L. Friedman: The Lexus and the Olive Tree, The World is Flat

- Combined Arms Center: FM 3-0: Operations, The Counterinsurgency Field Manual, FM 3-24 and Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5

-and many more, but these form the basis of my personal understanding of global conflict and the prescription for its cure . . . I welcome additional submissions for my perusing pleasure.

Additionally, there is a great spectrum of my fellow Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, and Airmen, whom I turn to as sources of information, insight, and experience. And there are of course other sources such as blogs, traditional media outlets, and my own twisted imagination.

For those not squared away on current military affairs, there are essentially two schools of thought on the direction of future conflict. They are generally, but by no means entirely, divided along generational lines, with an older, Cold War-era group seeing a world where the great powers of the planet must inevitably clash in tradtional military struggles, and a younger, mostly junior and senior officer crowd that sees the future of the military lying in stability operations, conterinsurgency, and humanitarian aid, all with the purpose of reducing regional conflicts that could scale up into larger full-fledged wars. These distinctions rule over how they see aquisitions, research, force structure, pretty much everything that comprises the military. If you believe in the Stability Operations crowd, you want Amphibious Warfare ships, UAVs, and tons of boots on the ground to do everything from handing out aid to tracking down terrorists. If you are a Westphalian Warrior, you want Tanks, Subs, F-22s, all complemented with a healthy serving of Nukes on the side.

I believe that we must have a force for both types of warfare. One that can eliminate state actors by force, and one that can work with NGOs, coalition partners, and local leaders to target violent non-state actors, build up local security infrastructure, and pave the way for economic development that eventually improves quality of life. I believe that we need a small, conventional force that is "sized" to take down the armed forces of the most militarily powerful non-nuclear enabled "rogue" state. (currently Iran) And a larger constabulary force that can act to spread security in any part of the world destabilized by disaster, be it natural or man-made.

This blog is a discussion about how to best achieve those two forces, as they are what is expected of us as a military force by both the world and the American taxpayer. I offer this basic outline only as a starting point, and welcome discussion, including that which suggests we go completely one way or the other. Who knows, maybe you'll change my mind.